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THE YALE LAW JOURNAL FORUM
NOVEMBER 26, 2018

Impeachment: A Handbook
Philip C. Bobbitt
preface to the new edition
It is said that in the United States, a “new & improved” label will always
increase sales.1 This is doubtless a testament to our irrepressible optimism.2
Since the publication of Impeachment: A Handbook, by Charles L. Black, Jr.,
in 1974, it has become the standard work. Lawfare called it “the most important
book ever written on presidential impeachment.”3 Its sales peak whenever there
is impeachment talk in the Congress, and staffers can be seen like
schoolchildren carrying their vade mecums.
As the 2018 midterm elections approached, there was some anxiety—and
no doubt, in some quarters, hope—that impeachment might again be
undertaken. As it happened, I was teaching the Handbook in my Legal Methods
class at Columbia as an exquisite demonstration of the forms of constitutional
argument. My students complained that the book had been published before
any deﬁnitive action was taken to remove President Nixon, and they chafed to
know how Black would have dealt with the signiﬁcant questions of the hour—
both then and now. Was the hacking of the Democratic campaign chairman’s
emails in 2016 like the burglary of the Democratic campaign chairman’s
1.
2.
3.

By contrast, in the United Kingdom, realtors say that a new house is harder to sell.
What other country would have established a nationwide organization of societies of
businessmen called the “Optimist Club” in the middle of the First World War?
Jane Chong, To Impeach a President: Applying the Authoritative Guide from Charles Black,
LAWFARE (July 20, 2017, 2:00 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/impeach-president
-applying-authoritative-guide-charles-black [https://perma.cc/5CQ6-UH8E].
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correspondence at the Watergate complex in 1972? Was the Republican
campaign’s contacts with Russian diplomats in 2016 like the Nixon campaign’s
contacts with South Vietnamese diplomats in 1968? Do the House Judiciary
Committee’s charges against Nixon set a precedent deﬁning an “impeachable
offense” arising from improper use of the Justice Department,4 even though
the President resigned before the House could vote on this charge?5 Was the
Clinton impeachment charge for the obstruction of justice a precedent because
it was adopted by the House6—or not, because the Senate did not convict on
this charge?7 And what about issues Black didn’t address, like the relation
between the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and impeachment, or the role of the
Emoluments Clause as a possible basis for impeachment? And what about the
president’s pardon power?8 Are there circumstances in which the issuance of a
pardon—or the promise of one—can provide a ground for impeachment?
To all of these questions, I gave the same answer: my students had all they
needed in Black’s book. It wouldn’t tell them what to think of these or any other
problems, even in the Nixon case, which was unfolding as the book was
written. The Handbook would instruct them how to think. It laid out clearly and
concisely the methods by which a legal answer could be derived from the text,
history, structure, doctrine, practicality, and ethos of the Constitution, and it
showed rather elegantly how to apply these six fundamental methods.
Still, I took the students’ point. Black’s chapter “Application to Particular
Problems” cried out for the application of his methods to the problems raised
by the class. And there were important precedents—cases of attempted and
partly successful impeachments that created or affirmed doctrine—that had
occurred since the book’s publication.
Moreover, while Black’s masterpiece remained the standard reference work,
new books on presidential impeachment were appearing by writers I liked and
respected that, because of their intrinsic merit and also because of the
4.

5.

6.
7.

8.

ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST PRESIDENT NIXON, H.R. REP. No. 93-1305 (1974),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CDOC-106sdoc3/pdf/GPO-CDOC-106sdoc3-19-3
.pdf [https://perma.cc/24M3-CSFG].
Carroll Kilpatrick, Nixon Resigns, WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 1974), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/watergate/articles/080974-3.htm
[https://perma.cc
/DH6P-79A6].
Articles of Impeachment Against William Jefferson Clinton, H.R. Res. 611, https://www
.congress.gov/105/bills/hres611/BILLS-105hres611enr.pdf [https://perma.cc/37AZ-L873].
Roll Call Vote 106th Congress—1st Session, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/legislative
/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=106&session=1&vote=00018#top
[https://perma.cc/6DTE-LT8B].
Article II, Section 2 provides that the President “shall have Power to grant Reprieves and
Pardons . . . except in cases of Impeachment.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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consumer bias for the “new & improved,” might eclipse the Handbook in the
marketplace.9 That would be a great shame, not because there is anything
wrong with these new books but because outside the esoteric topic of
impeachment, Black’s book was a key exposition of how we go about resolving
constitutional questions in the absence of a Supreme Court opinion. (This
remains, I hate to say, a continuing problem for the ﬁeld. When asked whether
a president could pardon himself, a prominent law professor replied, “There
really is no answer to this question since it has never arisen.”) Allowing Black’s
book to gather dust on the library shelves would be far more than simply a loss
for the literature on impeachment, which in any case would build on his
insights. It would remove a foundation stone from the intellectual ediﬁce that
is perhaps the most important advance made in constitutional law during my
lifetime: the development of what might be called the “standard model”10 that
enables legislators, citizens, and journalists as well as judges to resolve
constitutional questions when there is no authoritative judicial precedent, and
to assess judicial opinions when there is a precedent. Black’s tour de force11 is as
important to this development as Weinberg and Salam’s equations are to the
Standard Model in physics.12
The one thing I refused to do in this new edition was to touch a word of
Black’s inimitable writing. It was enough that I was foolishly prepared to put
my own stolid texts next to his poet-perfect prose. I would not “revise” Black’s
work of genius.
So here it is: new (in some respects) but not improved.
Philip Bobbitt
March 18, 2018
9.

See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, IMPEACHMENT: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE (2017); LAURENCE TRIBE &
JOSHUA MATZ, TO END A PRESIDENCY: THE POWER OF IMPEACHMENT (2018).
10. See Jack M. Balkin, Foreword to PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (2d ed.
forthcoming 2019) (noting that the standard view is that “all legitimate constitutional
argument takes the form of one of six modalities: appeals to the text, to structure, to history,
to precedent, to prudence (or consequences), and to national character (or ethos)”).
11. For a similar exposition on another important but nonjusticiable constitutional question, see
Charles L. Black, Jr., A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court Nominees, 79 YALE
L.J. 657 (1970).
12. The “standard model” is the name given in the 1970s to a theory of particle physics that
describes how elementary particles interact. It incorporated those subatomic particles known
at the time, classiﬁed them, and predicted the existence of additional particles. See Christine
Sutton, Electroweak Theory, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com
/science/electroweak-theory [https://perma.cc/4Y8R-WNFE]; Christine Sutton, Standard
Model, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/science/Standard-Model
[https://perma.cc/4UBF-LXAB].
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i. chapter seven: recent precedents
Charles Black’s essay was written during the constitutional crisis provoked
by the efforts of Richard Nixon’s presidential campaign to corrupt the
processes of the 1972 election. Since then, we have experienced several other
tremors of varying force in the landscape of impeachment.
Doctrinal arguments in constitutional law are developed case by case,
following rules laid down in precedents. Very few actions by the Congress are
governed by doctrine, but the Congress’s—and the president’s constitutional
decisions—are subject to a similar sort of doctrinal analysis as those of courts or
other legal institutions. As in common-law doctrine, the rule of “last in time”
prevails (recent precedents are more salient than older ones),13 but the
signiﬁcance to be accorded these precedents varies with the authority of the
decider. The 1999 impeachment and acquittal of President Bill Clinton carries
more authority than the abortive attempt by a state legislature in 2008 to bring
about impeachment proceedings against President George W. Bush,14 even
though the latter is more recent. And what is the signiﬁcance, if any, of the
attempted impeachments against Presidents Ronald Reagan and Barack
Obama? Can we infer that the legal bases for these indictments—respectively,
the creation of a secret, privately funded covert action capability15 and the
refusal to enforce congressional mandates regarding narcotics and
immigration16—were constitutionally inadequate? Or that the facts simply
didn’t support the claims of high crimes, assuming these charges amount to
such infractions?
There is something to be learned from the doctrinal history of presidential
impeachments since 1974,17 but perhaps the most important development has

13.
14.
15.
16.

17.

With the caveat that in the American system, the principle of stare decisis—the doctrinal
reliance on governing precedent—can always be overruled.
For example, see the New Hampshire legislature’s failed effort in 2008. H.R. 24, 2008 Sess.
(N.H. 2008).
H.R. Res. 370, 98th Cong. (regarding covert action in Grenada); H.R. Res. 111, 100th
Cong. (regarding the Iran-Contra affair).
S. Con. Res. 43, 55th Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2016), http://webserver1.lsb.state.ok.us/cf_pdf
/2015-16%20INT/SRES/SCR43%20INT.PDF [https://perma.cc/4MAK-H894]; see also
Jennifer Steinhauser, Ignoring Qualms, Some Republicans Nurture Dreams of Impeaching
Obama, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/25/us/politics
/ignoring-qualms-some-republicans-nurture-dreams-of-impeaching-obama.html
[https://perma.cc/PY4E-JJDT].
Just as there is from earlier precedents: the acquittals of Justice Chase and President Johnson
“—decided not by courts but by the United States Senate—surely contributed as much to
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been the transfer of inﬂuence from the organs of governmental decisionmaking to the public. Black’s essay emphasized the solemnity of the American
trial process and cautioned that “a snow of telegrams ought to play no part” in
it. The taking of polls regarding guilt or innocence would be “an unspeakable
indecency.” That position, however faithful to the history, text, and structure of
the impeachment provisions, is harder to maintain today.
What has changed is ourselves: we no longer have the conﬁdence in the
leadership of Congress that we had in the Nixon era, and impeachment is a
supremely congressional action (indeed one reason we have lost that
conﬁdence is the ﬁasco of the Clinton impeachment by the House). Moreover,
owing to the zeal of some (and perhaps the self-absorption of others), we have
compromised the habits of decorum, fastidious withholding of judgment,
impartial procedures, detachment from partisanship, and insistence on
fundamental fairness that Black thought necessary to the due process of
impeachment. We are more inclined to treat impeachment as a political
struggle for public opinion, waged in the media, and less like the grand inquest
envisioned by the Constitution’s Framers. The “vigilant waiting” urged by
Black18 is less acceptable to a citizenry inﬂamed by its political divisions and
uncertain as to the competence of its institutions.
There remains, however, this hope: that our people come to believe, even
more than they believe the superiority of their own opinions, that the best
means of realizing their preferences, and of preserving the values on which
they believe their preferences to be based, lies in the working of legal
institutions whose legitimacy depends on shared understandings, not sheer
partisan political power. If this becomes the ethos of the new century, then the
precedents still to be formed will restore Black’s reverence for the due process
of impeachment as it stood in 1974, poised before the abyss.
A. Nixon and Watergate
On February 6, 1974, one year after a Senate committee convened its
investigation19 of a burglary at the Democratic campaign’s Watergate
headquarters, the House of Representatives passed a resolution authorizing the
House Judiciary Committee to determine if grounds existed to bring a Bill of

the maintenance of our tripartite federal system of government as any case decided by any
court.” WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS 278 (1992).
18. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR. & PHILIP BOBBITT, IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK, NEW EDITION 5
(2018).
19. 119 CONG. REC. 3831 (1973).
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Impeachment against Richard Nixon.20 Following a subpoena21 from the
special prosecutor as part of a grand jury inquiry, on April 30, 1974, the White
House released to the House committee edited transcripts of tapes made of
Oval Office conversations. When the special prosecutor pressed for unedited
transcripts and additional conversations,22 the White House refused23 on
grounds that the recordings were protected from compelled disclosure by
executive privilege. On July 24, however, the Supreme Court ordered the
president to comply with the subpoena. The pace quickened. On July 27, 29,
and 30, the committee approved three proposed Articles of Impeachment and
sent them to the full House.24 Before the House could vote, Nixon on August 5
released an incriminating tape that triggered a collapse in his support in
Congress.25 He resigned on the 8th.26
Does Nixon’s resignation create a precedent, even though there was no
impeachment and conviction? What is the scope of that precedent? Is it
coextensive with the charges in the Bill of Impeachment?
At a minimum, we can dismiss two proposed counts that were not referred
to the full House: one charging the president with misleading the Congress
regarding the secret bombing of Cambodia, and one alleging a failure to pay
appropriate income taxes.27 There is little doubt that making war in the
absence of an imminent hostile attack must occur with the acquiescence of
Congress, but there was some doubt whether the administration, by informing
senior congressional officials, had constructively informed the larger
membership as well. It was also not clear whether a particular bombing
campaign within a larger, authorized war might be within the prerogatives of
20.
21.

22.

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

H.R. Res. 803, 93rd Cong. (1974).
Richard Nixon, Address to the Nation Announcing Answer to the House Judiciary
Committee Subpoena for Additional Presidential Tape Recordings (Apr. 29, 1974), http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=4189 [https://perma.cc/C977-845C].
John Herbers, Nixon Will Give Edited Tape Transcripts on Watergate to House and the Public;
Notes Ambiguities, Insists He Is Innocent. N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 1974), https://www.nytimes
.com/1974/04/30/archives/nixon-will-give-edited-tape-transcripts-on-watergate-to-house
-and.html [https://perma.cc/XN4A-8H6Z].
Two subpoenas in May and one in June were ignored, according to the third article of
impeachment. ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST PRESIDENT NIXON, supra note 4.
Id.
The Smoking Gun Tape, WATERGATE.INFO, http://watergate.info/1972/06/23/the-smoking
-gun-tape.html [https://perma.cc/BU57-DBSB].
Kilpatrick, supra note 5.
See David E. Rosenbaum, 2 Articles Fail to Win in Panel, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 1974),
https://www.nytimes.com/1974/07/31/archives/2-articles-fail-to-win-in-panel-taxes-and
-bombing-issues-defeated.html [https://perma.cc/A3PV-3A93].
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the commander in chief, at least in the absence of congressional action to the
contrary.28 The president’s failure to pay taxes is not in itself a high crime or
misdemeanor because it is unrelated to his official duties; this count also
decisively failed in the committee.29
The three Articles of Impeachment sent to the House charged that the
president obstructed the investigation of the Watergate burglary (adopted by a
committee vote of 27-11); that he engaged in a pattern of conduct that violated
various rights of individual citizens (adopted 28-10); and that he refused to
cooperate with the committee by providing materials when requested (adopted
21-17).30 Of these three proposed Articles, the most we can say is that the
president apparently judged at least one of them a sufficient basis for his
resignation, thus giving Nixon’s resignation the vague status of a plea bargain
negotiated in advance of an indictment—or perhaps what is called an Alford
plea, wherein a defendant while asserting his innocence admits that the
evidence is sufficient for him to be found guilty.31 In this case, a president
effectively preempted indictment— impeachment—by voluntarily accepting the
penalties that would have accompanied his conviction.
Thus the effective constitutional consequences of the Nixon precedent
presume that at least one of the three counts was legally and factually sufficient
for the president’s removal from office. Moreover, and more decisively, we
know from multiple sources that by August 5, 1974, following the release of
incriminating conversations recorded in the Oval Office, more than two-thirds
of the Senate votes needed for conviction were committed against the
president.32
We can eliminate the third count as a precedent because the offense of
contempt of Congress, on which Article 3 of the Bill of Impeachment was
based,33 would have been cured by the release of the tapes and transcripts

28.
29.

30.
31.
32.

33.

BLACK & BOBBITT, supra note 18, at 40.
The vote was twelve to twenty-six against for both failed articles of impeachment. See H.
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, H.R. REP. NO. 93-1305 (1974); James M. Naughton, House Panel, 21 to 17, Charges
Nixon with Defying Subpoenas, N.Y. Times (July 31, 1974), https://www.nytimes.com/1974
/07/31/archives/house-panel-21-to-17-charges-nixon-with-defying-subpoenas-ends
-its.html [https://perma.cc/K98R-YG4N].
Naughton, supra note 29.
See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
See, e.g., Kilpatrick, supra note 5; The Unmaking of the President, TIME (Aug. 19, 1974),
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1996/analysis/back.time/9608/21/index.shtml
[https://perma.cc/P33P-4DTE].
ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST PRESIDENT NIXON, supra note 4.
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requested by the House Judiciary Committee, which, in the event, led to the
president’s resignation. That leaves Articles 1 and 2, both of which charged
Nixon with having violated his oath of office and the requirement of Article II
of the Constitution that he faithfully execute the laws.34 The basis for this
charge in Article 1 lay in the president’s impeding, delaying, and obstructing
the investigation into the attempted theft of materials from the Democratic
campaign headquarters (which he was not charged with planning.)35 Article 2
charged a violation of much the same duties in four separate spheres: violating
the rights of citizens through IRS audits and the unauthorized sharing of
personal data, and through surveillance outside that authorized by lawful
authority; interfering with Department of Justice (DOJ) and CIA operations to
effect a cover-up of White House officials’ involvement in the break-in; failing
to report what he knew once he learned about the break-in; and creating a
special intelligence unit in the White House.36 There is ample historical
evidence, based primarily on statements by Nixon’s Republican defenders in
the House, that Article 1 would have commanded broad support. The support
for Articles 2 and 3 was less deﬁnitive.37
Dealing with congressional doctrine much as we might parse the judicial
opinions of a multimember panel, we can say that Nixon’s resignation stands
for the proposition that where agents of a presidential campaign have violated
the law in order to acquire political intelligence, and where the president,
whether or not he was aware of the scheme, subsequently engages in a course
of conduct intended to impede or mislead investigation of this illicit
operation—such as by counseling witnesses to issue false statements,
promising or paying “hush money” to potential witnesses, making false
statements to US officials, withholding evidence, promising favorable
treatment for silence, or making false statements to the public—there is a
sufficient predicate for impeachment.
Thus, far from eviscerating the precedent, or at least creating no new
doctrine, as would have been the case had the charges been withdrawn before
the House could vote on them, the president’s own conduct stands for the
recognition that the gravamen of at least one of the charges satisﬁed Article II’s
requirement of a “high crime” against the Constitution.

34.

Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Statement by Wiggins on Support of Impeachment, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 1974), https://
www.nytimes.com/1974/08/06/archives/statement-by-wiggins-on-support-of
-impeachment-give-new-meaning.html [https://perma.cc/P2R3-P37U].
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B. Reagan and Iran-Contra
For the increasingly fraught relationship between Congress and the
president today, the Watergate affair is the gift that keeps on giving. One such
gift is the legacy of the Church Committee, convened in 1975 to explore the
Nixon administration’s illicit use of the intelligence agencies, which had been
uncovered by the Senate Judiciary Committee in its Watergate investigation.
The Church Committee examined CIA and FBI abuses more broadly, including
the improper monitoring of American citizens’ political activities as well as
various sensational intrigues abroad.38 In the aftermath of the ensuing
revelations, Congress enacted various statutory and regulatory restraints on
covert action—and pressed for a restrictive executive order promulgated by the
Ford administration—that many intelligence professionals felt hampered their
ability to compete effectively against foreign adversaries.39
By the 1980s, US covert operations faced a funding cutoff in Central
America40 and risked exposure there and elsewhere from congressional
committees that were, by law, required to be informed of these secret plans.41
This conﬂict with the Congress occurred against the backdrop of a rise in antiAmerican terrorism in the Near East42 and the apparent inability of US
38.

39.
40.

41.
42.

See David E. Rosenbaum, C.I.A.-F.B.I. Inquiry Voted by Senate, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 1975),
https://www.nytimes.com/1975/01/28/archives/ciafbi-inquiry-voted-by-senate-church-is
-expected-to-be-named.html [https://perma.cc/E587-EL7R].
For what it’s worth, my own view is that this encroachment of law and legality into
clandestine operations has been a considerable boon on the whole.
See, e.g., Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.
99-83, 99 Stat. 190 (1985); Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984); Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-215, 97 Stat. 1473 (1983); An Act Making Appropriations For the
Department of Defense For the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1984, and For Other
Purposes, Pub. L. No. 98-212, 97 Stat. 1421 (1983); Joint Resolution, Pub. L. No. 97-377, 96
Stat. 1830 (1982).
See Intelligence Oversight Act, Pub. L. No. 96-450, 94 Stat. 1975 (1980).
See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Buildings Blasted: Truck Loaded with TNT Wrecks
Headquarters of a Marine Unit, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 1983), https://archive.nytimes.com
/www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/991023onthisday_big.html?module=inline
[https://perma.cc/JJ45-4SKK] (reporting that a U.S. Marine unit had been bombed in
Beirut, killing 241 Americans); Thomas L. Friedman, U.S. Beirut Embassy Bombed; 33
Reported Killed, 80 Hurt; Pro-Iran Sect Admits Action, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 1983), https://
www.nytimes.com/1983/04/19/world/us-beirut-embassy-bombed-33-reported-killed-80hurt
-pro-iran-sect-admits-action.html [https://perma.cc/8DQ6-2E8Z]; Les Ledbetter, Kuwait
Car Bomb Hits U.S. Embassy; Damage Extensive, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 1983), https://www
.nytimes.com/1983/12/12/world/kuwait-car-bomb-hits-us-embassy-damage-extensive.html
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clandestine operations to penetrate and neutralize the groups responsible.43
Throughout 1984 and 1985, the United States was the target of bombings,
assassinations of its diplomats, hijackings of sea and aircraft, and, ominously, a
wave of kidnappings originating in the stateless chaos of Lebanon.44 The
traditional methods of counterterrorism, which depend upon ﬁrm local
authority and careful police work, seemed impossible in such circumstances.
The Reagan administration struggled to secure the release of hostages,45
several of whom were tortured and killed.46 Despite its failure to protect its
agents, the administration steadfastly refused to pay ransoms.47 Thus the
country was genuinely shocked to learn from a report ﬁrst published in a
Lebanese magazine that a secret mission, headed by the president’s former
national security advisor, had traveled to Iran to do just that.48 The mission was
sent to negotiate a ransom payment by means of the sale of otherwise
embargoed US missiles to the Iranian regime.49
When Justice Department officials, who thought they were investigating a
relatively simple arms-for-hostages scandal, stumbled upon a memorandum
that quite casually listed the Nicaraguan Contras, a right-wing insurgency
against that country’s elected socialist government, as recipients of proﬁts from
the illicit arms transactions, the effect on the public was electrifying. It

43.
44.
45.

46.

47.

48.

49.

[https://perma.cc/338K-J88G]; Bob Woodward & Charles R. Babcock, Captive CIA Agent’s
Death Galvanized Hostage Search, WASH. POST. (Nov. 25, 1986), https://www.cia.gov/library
/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00965R000807560015-3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WB2B
-L87J] (reporting that the CIA station chief in Beirut that was kidnapped on March 16, 1984
was dead).
See Timothy Naftali, US Counterterrorism Before Bin Laden, 60 INT’L J., no. 1, Winter,
2004/2005, at 25, 27.
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
Stephen Engelberg, The White House Crisis; U.S. Aides Tell of Hostage Plan That Collapsed,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 1987), https://www.nytimes.com/1987/03/02/world/the-white-house
-crisis-us-aides-tell-of-hostage-plan-that-collapsed.html [https://perma.cc/HA72-HN2Z].
See, e.g., Ihsan A. Hijazi, Gunmen in Beirut Kidnap American, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 1985),
https://www.nytimes.com/1985/03/17/world/gunmen-in-beirut-kidnap-american.html
[https://perma.cc/Z2WP-JQFW]. The hostage was later killed. See Engelberg, supra note
45. For another example, see Woodward & Babcock, supra note 42.
See Bernard Weinraub, President Bars ‘Concessions’; Orders Antihijacking Steps; 3 More TWA
Hostages Freed, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 1985), https://www.nytimes.com/1985/06/19/world
/president-bars-concessions-orders-antihijacking-steps-3-more-twa-hostages-freed.html
[https://perma.cc/H7GT-DJZ2].
Ihsan A. Hijazi, Hostage’s Release is Linked to Shift in Iranian Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4,
1986), https://www.nytimes.com/1986/11/04/world/hostage-s-release-is-linked-to-shift-in
-iranian-policy.html [https://perma.cc/3YC2-NGPB].
Id.
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appeared not only that the president had been lying about ransoming
hostages—“America will never make concessions to terrorists,” Reagan had
asserted in a news conference in June 1985—but that he had taken the
opportunity presented by the ransom deal to divert funds to aid the
Nicaraguan insurgency in deﬁance of US statutes forbidding such assistance.
When the Senate select committee appointed to investigate the affair began its
work in early 1987,50 the public and the Congress believed they already had a
relatively clear picture of the facts in the Iran-Contra scandal. This picture was
depicted in the report of the Tower Commission, whose account went as
follows: the president, in a desperate effort to rescue American hostages held
captive in Lebanon, had agreed to sell hitherto embargoed arms to the Iranian
government; because these weapons were procured at wholesale cost to the US
government and sold at a black market price to the Iranians, they brought a
substantial proﬁt; instead of being returned to the US Treasury, these proﬁts
were then “diverted” to the Contras. The question of the hour was: Did the
president know about this diversion?51
This focus on the diversion reﬂected a mistaken assumption among the
president’s political enemies that only a violation of the US Criminal Code
could serve as grounds for impeachment. They seized on the diversion as the
most promising basis for such a charge. If the president had contrived to
misappropriate funds that properly belonged to the Treasury by authorizing
that the proﬁts from the sale of US war materiel be sent to the Contras, then
proof of this would serve as the predicate for his removal from office. The
House majority staff conducted an investigation that appeared to be based on
these assumptions.52 Interestingly, and with perhaps greater insight, the
president’s closest counselors were also willing to stake their hopes on the
outcome of a contest over the president’s knowledge of the diversion. They
believed that the president would not have paid much attention to what was
little more than an accounting method.

50.

See Understanding the Iran-Contra Affairs: The Hearings, BROWN, https://www.brown.edu
/Research/Understanding_the_Iran_Contra_Affair/thehearings.php
[https://perma.cc
/J7KQ-UDRC].
51. See Steven V. Roberts, The White House Crisis: The Tower Report Inquiry Finds Reagan and
Chief Advisers Responsible for ‘Chaos’ in Iran Arms Deals; Reagan Also Blamed, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 27, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/02/27/world/white-house-crisis-tower
-report-inquiry-ﬁnds-reagan-chief-advisers-responsible.html
[https://perma.cc/7LNV
-HAZH].
52. REP. OF THE CONG. COMMS. INVESTIGATING THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR, S. REPT. NO. 100216, at 411 (1987), https://archive.org/details/reportofcongress87unit/page/n0 [https://
perma.cc/NA5Z-4A3H].
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In fact, the constitutional violation was far more profound than the
diversion. The more serious offense lay in the development of a quasi-private
covert action capability of which the diversion was merely a minor side effect. A
privatized, off-the-books covert action agency offered the administration
several important advantages. First, the outsourced agency could manage the
Contra insurgency, fulﬁlling the oversight role played by the CIA before its
funding and participation were curtailed through a series of statutes.53 The
privatized agency would avoid the unwelcome scrutiny of Congress because it
would not be subject to congressional funding, and this too was thought to
enhance the secrecy of its projects.54 Second, such an agency could act more
daringly, avoiding the legal restraints of executive orders that it would be
embarrassing to repeal.55 It could defy certain international norms against
reprisal because it would not be deﬁnitively associated with the US
government. Thus it might recapture the initiative that the United States
seemed to have surrendered to terrorist groups. Finally, the agency’s apparent
detachment from the official government would afford the president plausible
denial of US responsibility should the agency’s operations be exposed. Statutes
adopted in the late 1970s required that the president verify in writing the
necessity of each covert operation and inform congressional oversight
committees about them. These laws had greatly increased the political risk of
these operations, since the president’s authorization might always be exposed
after he had issued a public denial.56
There was, however, a fundamental constitutional problem with this bright
idea. Article I provides the link between government operations and the
democratic mandate by requiring that all funding take place by statute,57 that

53.

54.
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See Memorandum on the 1984 Boland Amendment from J.R. Scharfen to W. Robert
Pearson (Aug. 23, 1985), http://www.brown.edu/Research/Understanding_the_Iran
_Contra_Affair/documents/d-nic-21.pdf [https://perma.cc/KS9E-F5R3].
REP. OF THE CONG. COMMS. INVESTIGATING THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR, S. REPT. NO. 100-216
(1987).
See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, at § 2.11 (Dec. 4, 1981), reprinted as amended
in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (2018) (prohibiting assassinations by any “person employed by or acting
on behalf of the United States Government” or any “agency of the Intelligence
Community”).
See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1981, Pub. L. No. 96-450, § 501, 94 Stat.
1975, 1981-82 (codiﬁed as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 3091 (2018)) (“The President shall fully
inform the intelligence committees in a timely fashion of intelligence operations in foreign
countries, other than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence . . . .”).
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States . . . .”).
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is, by the actions of elected officials who can be turned out by the voters every
biennium. In attempting to circumvent Article I by relying on nonappropriated
funds, no matter how noble his purpose and no matter how beneﬁcent the
source, the president was striking at the Article’s role as the very foundation of
our democratic system. Article I provides the check on the actions of the federal
government provided by the biennial election of members of the House.
This error in attempting to use nonappropriated funds is compounded by
the solicitation of operating funds from foreign governments with whom the
federal government alone has institutional economic, security, and diplomatic
relations. In some cases, where the “donating” country is the recipient of
federal assistance, the solicitations amount to little more than kickbacks, and
the executive avoids congressional oversight because the money comes from
the assistance program budget. Moreover, the United States can become
subject to blackmail when the donating regime threatens to expose the scheme.
The Federalist Papers do not treat this exotic subject directly, but a relevant
discussion can be found there. In Federalist #26, Alexander Hamilton observed:
“It has been said that the provision, which limits the appropriation of money
for the support of an army to the period of two years, would be unavailing:
because the executive, when once possessed of a force large enough to awe the
people into submission, would ﬁnd resources in that very force sufficient to
enable him to dispense with supplies from the acts of the legislature.”58 In the
same essay, Hamilton had discounted this concern, asserting the profound
importance of biennial elections for maintaining control through
appropriations. This seems to underscore the centrality of the appropriations
process, even and perhaps especially in the arena of national security.
In the event, nothing happened. The president went on television and
vaguely apologized for not appreciating that his scheme to release American
hostages could be perceived as a ransom.59 The “Enterprise,” as one of the
conspirators had named the private covert-action entity, was not discussed.
Without some appreciation of what was at stake, the idea of impeachment
faded with the inability to prove the president had himself directed the
diversion. A tree had fallen in the forest, but even those that heard it did not
recognize it as such.60 Article 2 of the Articles of Impeachment against Richard

58.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 26, at 173 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
President Ronald Reagan, Address on the Iran Contra Affair (Mar. 4, 1987), https://www
.nytimes.com/1987/03/05/us/reagan-white-house-transcript-reagan-s-speech-take-full
-responsibilty-for-my.html [https://perma.cc/S3XN-F79C].
60. A notable exception was the journalist Daniel Schorr. See, e.g., Daniel Schorr, A Whiff of
Watergate?, WASH. POST (Nov. 12, 1986), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive
59.
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Nixon adopted by the House Judiciary Committee had charged that the
president had “authorized and permitted to be maintained a secret investigative
unit [which was privately] ﬁnanced which unlawfully utilized the resources of
the Central Intelligence Agency, [and] engaged in covert . . . activities.”61 But
no connection was drawn between this charge and the privately ﬁnanced,
covert action agency set up by the National Security Council under President
Reagan.
Moreover, nothing compelled the Congress to go further. A decade later,
some members of Congress would argue that the Constitution gave the House
no discretion not to impeach the president if he had committed high crimes
and misdemeanors,62 but this erroneous insight lay in the future.
While there is no doctrinal precedent to be inferred from this travesty, it
would be idle to suppose that the secret privatizing of federal functions ended
with the Iran-Contra affair. It waits, hidden in the groundcover of
constitutional misapprehension, and will no doubt stir again as market
mechanisms replace agency regulations as a preferred means of governmental
operations.
C. Clinton and Gingrich
What is the scope of the precedent created by the Clinton impeachment if,
as in the Andrew Johnson impeachment, the Senate refused to convict? Does
the refusal to convict cast doubt on the legal sufficiency of the indictment,
given that the principal facts were not really at issue?
On November 5, 1997, well after the independent counsel Robert Fiske had
determined that Bill Clinton and his wife had not acted improperly in the
collapse of an Arkansas bank and land development scheme known as
Whitewater, and well before the conﬁdante of a former White House intern
secretly taped the intern’s revelations of a brief affair with the president,63 a
Georgia congressman introduced House Resolution 304 along with seventeen
/opinions/1986/11/12/a-whiff-of-watergate/f2b71ace-da9e-4186-b753-bd1c38dbdcf3/?utm
_term=.3118b709a0cc [https://perma.cc/TXX9-S67Q].
61. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-1305, at 3 (1974).
62. See, e.g., H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 105TH CONG., CONSIDERATION OF ARTICLES OF
IMPEACHMENT (Comm. Print 1999); Rep. Jim Leach, Impeachment Decision, C-SPAN (Dec.
16, 1998), https://www.c-span.org/video/?116691-1/impeachment-decision [https://perma
.cc/4WXR-WFFP] (describing President Clinton’s conduct as an “absolute breach of an
absolute standard”).
63. The Tripp Audio Tapes, N.Y. TIMES, https://partners.nytimes.com/library/politics/111898
triptapes.2a.ram.htmlmanager [https://perma.cc/CT86-FLJU].
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cosponsors.64 This resolution called for an investigation to determine whether
there existed grounds for Clinton’s impeachment, though none of its claims
ever made it into the Bill of Impeachment (of which the congressman became a
House manager65), or into the report of the independent counsel who
succeeded Fiske, which provided the basis on which Clinton was impeached.
Nevertheless, the resolution caught the affronted mood and the venom evoked
in many by the president and the exhilaration of the effort, nurtured by the
Speaker of the House, to contrive the president’s removal. The history of the
Clinton impeachment is not one of an unfolding, escalating disclosure of the
president’s maneuvers, like Watergate, but rather a largely fortuitous
combination of parallel legal moves actuated not so much by events as by an
obsessive ambition to remove Clinton from the White House by whatever
means could be found.
Parallel lines of inquiry linked the independent counsel’s Whitewater
investigations and a private civil suit, ﬁnanced by the president’s political
opponents, over an alleged sexual advance. Both scandals, if that’s what they
were, occurred when Clinton was governor of Arkansas, before he became
president. Had either strand played out on legal grounds, there might never
have been an impeachment proceeding. The independent counsel never found
any evidence of wrongdoing with respect to the Whitewater matter, and sexual
misconduct is not, in itself, an impeachable offense, barring some nexus
between this behavior and the president’s official duties. It was only when
these two lines of attack were studiedly brought into intersection that a trap
could be laid for the president, tempting him into false testimony that might
conceivably serve, it was thought, as a predicate for impeachment.
The Whitewater scandal erupted into the national consciousness when a
New York Times story66—which did not charge the Clintons with anything
unlawful—was suddenly supercharged by the suicide, in late July 1993,67 of a
deputy White House counsel and former law partner of the ﬁrst lady in Little
Rock. Republicans in the Congress pressed for the appointment of an
independent counsel to investigate Whitewater and its relationship to this
64.

H.R. Res. 304, 105th Cong. (1997).
65. Prosecution Who’s Who, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 1999), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp
-srv/politics/special/clinton/prosecution.htm [https://perma.cc/G58V-TPEF].
66. Jeff Gerth, Clintons Joined S.&L. Operator in an Ozark Real-Estate Venture, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
8, 1992), https://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/08/us/1992-campaign-personal-ﬁnances
-clintons-joined-s-l-operator-ozark-real-estate.html [https://perma.cc/265B-U9WN].
67. Thomas L. Friedman, White House Aide Leaves No Clue About Suicide, N.Y. TIMES (July 22,
1993), https://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/22/us/white-house-aide-leaves-no-clue-about
-suicide.html [https://perma.cc/F3ET-YM3E].
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death.68 Perhaps convinced that he had not behaved improperly, the president
asked the attorney general to appoint such a counsel. Because the statute
authorizing the office of the independent counsel had expired,69 she made the
appointment on the basis of her authority as head of the Justice Department,
choosing a prominent Republican lawyer, Robert Fiske.70 After a six-month
investigation, his office issued a ﬁnal report71 dispatching claims of foul play in
the death of the deputy counsel. As for the Whitewater charges, Fiske’s report
amply sustained an independent study commissioned by the regulatory body
overseeing the reconstitution of failed banks, which had cleared the president
and former governor.72
After Congress reauthorized the independent counsel statute, a three-judge
panel appointed Kenneth Starr, a respected former solicitor general, to go over
the same ground.73 Starr spent three years investigating Whitewater and was
unable to ﬁnd any prosecutable wrongdoing by either the president or Mrs.
Clinton.74 When he submitted his ﬁnal report to the House Judiciary
Committee to urge impeachment, he scarcely mentioned the Whitewater
matter. Instead, he offered the results of a lengthy investigation into charges of
sexual misconduct by the president.75
A former White House employee, who befriended a former White House
intern and became her conﬁdante, began secretly taping their conversations at
the suggestion of a literary agent who was prominent among anti-Clinton
68.

69.

70.
71.
72.

73.

74.
75.

David Johnston, Counsel Granted a Broad Mandate in Clinton Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21,
1994),
https://www.nytimes.com/1994/01/21/us/counsel-granted-a-broad-mandate-in
-clinton-inquiry.html [https://perma.cc/7JKY-888A].
See An Act to Reauthorize the Office of Government Ethics, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L.
No. 100-598, 102 Stat. 3031 (1988) (reauthorizing the office of the independent counsel, but
including a sunset provision that would cause the statute to lapse after ﬁve years).
Johnston, supra note 68.
ROBERT B. FISKE, JR., REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL: IN RE VINCENT W. FOSTER, JR.
(1994).
The Wall Street Journal reported these ﬁndings in June 1995. Ellen Joan Pollock, Clintons Are
Vindicated in New Report, WALL ST. J., June 26, 1995, at B5. Notably, the New York Times did
not report these ﬁndings until many months later.
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Dan Froomkin, Untangling Whitewater, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp
-srv/politics/special/whitewater/whitewater.htm [https://perma.cc/TTL4-7DJ7].
REFERRAL FROM KENNETH W. STARR, INDEPENDENT COUNSEL, TO THE U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. DOC. NO. 105-310 (1998), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg
/CDOC-105hdoc310/pdf/CDOC-105hdoc310.pdf [https://perma.cc/BZ6D-LQWR].
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partisans.76 Part of the conversations concerned sex the intern had had with the
president. Frustrated at her inability to insinuate reports of the president’s
misconduct into mainstream news outlets, the conﬁdante gave the story to
lawyers representing a former Arkansas state employee, Paula Jones.77 Jones
had brought suit against the president alleging crass sexual behavior while he
was governor,78 and the suit eventually morphed from an effort to restore the
plaintiff’s self-respect into an effort to harass and humiliate the president.79
This lawsuit eventually brought together various anti-Clinton forces who,
though they wished to drive the president from office, probably never thought
this would be accomplished through impeachment based on Jones’s claims,
which were ultimately dismissed by the trial court.80
This picture changed in early January 1998, when a former law school
classmate of one of the members of the group ﬁnancing the Jones suit went to
work for the independent counsel.81 Informed about the secret taping, the
independent counsel authorized contact with the conﬁdante82 and also sought
approval from the DOJ and the panel that had appointed him to expand his
jurisdiction83 on the grounds that a friend of the president, allegedly linked to
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Dan Froomkin, Case Closed, WASH. POST (Dec. 3, 1998), http://www.washingtonpost.com
/wp-srv/politics/special/pjones/pjones.htm [https://perma.cc/Q7ZJ-XZMW].
One interrogatory served by the plaintiff demanded that Clinton state the name, address,
and telephone number of each and every individual other than Mrs. Clinton with whom he
had had sexual relations since 1977. See Jones’s Second Set of Questions for Clinton, WASH.
POST
(Oct.
1,
1997),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/special/pjones/docs/inter2.htm [https://perma.cc/3W79-T294].
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the Whitewater investigation, had also attempted to help the intern ﬁnd
postgovernment employment.84 Starr’s deputy apparently falsely assured the
deputy attorney general that there had been no contact with the Jones
attorneys.85 When the expanded authorization was given,86 events quickened.
Clinton was due to be questioned by Paula Jones’s attorneys just two days later,
on January 17, and they now could ask him about the intern.87 The day before
this deposition, the intern’s conﬁdante88 led her into an ambush: FBI agents
and three of the independent counsel’s deputies confronted her at a hotel in
Arlington, Virginia.89 There seems little question that, as a postmortem by the
Department of Justice later put it, lawyers for the independent counsel
exercised poor judgment in negotiating with the former intern without her
counsel present.90 Preventing her from informing her lawyer about the trap
into which she had been lured, however, was essential to ensnaring the
president.91 In a sworn deposition on January 17, 1998, Clinton denied having
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Lewinsky’s lawyer would have aborted the ﬁling of what would then have appeared to be a
false affidavit, which he unwittingly forwarded to the federal court in the Jones matter. See
The Lewinsky Affidavit, WASH. POST (Mar. 13, 1998), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp
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President’s lawyers. Had the President known that his erstwhile paramour was discussing
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sexual relations with the intern; claimed he could not remember ever having
been alone with her; and permitted his lawyer to state on the basis of an earlier,
false deposition by the intern that there was no sex in any manner between the
two.92 Starr concluded that Clinton had committed perjury and submitted his
ﬁndings to Congress.93
That report itself was without precedent and, especially in light of the
ultimate resolution by the Senate, should not serve as a model for future
reports by either independent counsels (authorized by statute) or special
counsels appointed by the Department of Justice. Leon Jaworski, when he was
a special prosecutor in the Watergate matter, scrupulously sent to the House
only a few factual ﬁles on President Nixon, accompanied by no
recommendations whatsoever.94 Starr, instead, urgently pressed the House to
impeach Clinton, both in his report95 and in testimony to the House Judiciary
Committee.96 The Judiciary Committee conducted few real hearings of its own,
choosing instead to rely mostly on the independent counsel’s report as a basis
for impeachment.
The full House considered four charges. The bases of these charges were
that the president had (1) abused his office by using staff to facilitate sexual
liaisons with other personnel, (2) used his office to buy silence by offering jobs
or threatening to embarrass others, and (3) lied under oath and given false
statements to the public to cover up his misconduct and thus to obstruct the
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For Impeachment, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/11/20/us
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pursuit of a lawful investigation and prosecution (which supported two of the
charges).97 The House ultimately adopted two Articles of Impeachment:
perjury to a grand jury, and obstruction of justice.98 Two other Articles failed:
the second count of perjury in the Jones case, and one accusing Clinton of
abuse of power.99 A trial in the US Senate began immediately after the seating
of the 106th Congress.100 A vote of 67 senators was required to remove Clinton
from office.101 In the event, 50 senators voted to convict the president on the
obstruction of justice charge and 45 voted to uphold the perjury charge.102 No
Democratic senator voted guilty on either charge.103 Thus Clinton, like Andrew
Johnson, was acquitted on all charges.104
In their summations, neither counsel for the president nor counsel for the
House managers addressed the issue of whether the president had committed a
constitutional crime: whether a nexus had been shown between his official
duty to uphold the Constitution and a concerted effort by him to imperil the
country through acts that undermined his unique duties as president.
It may well be that, two decades later, in the atmosphere of public outrage
over sexual misconduct by powerful men, Bill Clinton would have been driven
from office by his own party. Does that mean that the constitutional law of
impeachment has changed? Does greater sensitivity to rather crass and
manipulative sexual behavior elevate that behavior to a crime against the
perpetuation of the order and ethos of the State, even accepting that such
predations have enormous political and cultural consequences?
It is sometimes said nowadays that no corporate board member would
hesitate to remove a CEO found guilty of the president’s behavior. The Senate,
however, is not a board of directors, and it does not appoint the president. If
we know little about how the Framers and ratiﬁers of Article II would answer
this corporatist question, we know this: they decisively rejected removal of the
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.c-span.org/video/?c4479598/clinton-impeachment-trial-convenes-7-jan-1999
[https://
perma.cc/G2AB-HSFG].
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
145 CONG. REC. S1458-59 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999).
See id.
Impeachment, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/brief
ing/Senate_Impeachment_Role.htm [https://perma.cc/Y4TG-U79D].
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president for simple maladministration, and they rejected also the
subordination of the president to the Congress that such a power would
imply.105 But do their intentions really matter when we have a new, perhaps
more equitable consciousness? Or should that consciousness be reﬂected in
elections rather than in prosecutions and trials conducted by the Congress?
The aggressive change to more confrontational tactics between the branches of
government initiated and championed by the Speaker of the House at the time
of the Clinton impeachment is still with us, even to a heightened degree. The
news media’s adversarial mode (I have in mind the New York Times as much as
any cable news channel) was much in evidence in the Clinton catastrophe and
is with us still. But the Democrats who rallied around the president then would
be in a very different position today.
It is true that they protected the presidency from a fortuitous conspiracy
that would have changed the balance of constitutional power between the
branches. Starr even wanted to make the exercise of executive privilege an
impeachable offense—as did the equally aggressive members of the Judiciary
Committee during Watergate. Perhaps the Democrats were at fault for failing
to ﬁnd common ground with their Republican colleagues by forcing a
resignation—as the Republicans did to Nixon—especially since there was a
competent vice-president in the wings who had also been elected by the
American people.
Ultimately, the Clinton impeachment carries very little doctrinal or
precedential authority, because the House indictment was decisively rejected by
the Senate and because of the indictment’s peculiar grounds. If the answer to
the wrong question is not a wrong answer but no answer at all, then the
questions put to the Senate by the prosecution established no rules for the
future. There is a cautionary tale here, but its lessons are largely negative. They
urge us not to repeat this disgraceful episode.
If, for example, the president were knowingly to make bombastic and false
statements in public, or in private to his subordinates, that were neither crimes
in themselves nor related to his performance in office, he should not be
entrapped by federal officials asking him whether he knew the statements to be
untrue or be forced to reiterate them in sworn testimony. Only if the false
statement is part of a concerted effort to commit an impeachable offense—that
is, a constitutional crime—can such deceits serve as the predicate for
impeachment.

105.

2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 550 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
[hereinafter 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS] (quoting Madison, as saying, “So vague a term will be
equivalent to a tenure during pleasure of the Senate.”).
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There are, however, less substantive issues as to which the Clinton
impeachment did provide precedents. One was whether a Bill of Impeachment
adopted by the House of one Congress is sufficient to trigger a trial in the
Senate after a new Congress has convened—or whether a new bill must be
voted by the House. In the ordinary course of legislation, if a bill passes only
one house before a Congress ends, it must be reenacted by both houses of a
new Congress in order to be sent to the president for signing. In the case of
Andrew Johnson, the Bill of Impeachment was passed by the House and tried
by the Senate during the same Congress. In the Clinton case, a new Congress
might have made a difference, as the new House had more Democrats, and the
second Article of Impeachment barely passed the old House—although in the
event the new House continued to back the impeachment managers. But the
Senate chose to rely on Thomas Jefferson’s Manual of Parliamentary
Practice106—written when Jefferson presided over the Senate as vice-president—
and the precedents of judges impeached and tried by different Congresses.107
Because the Senate could have decided the other way, we may take the Clinton
precedent to be that a House from one Congress can validly refer an
impeachment to the Senate of another.
The Senate formulated an initial set of rules governing proceedings in the
run-up to President Johnson’s impeachment, and that framework largely
survived through the Clinton trial. In 1935, the Senate amended these rules to
include what is now Rule XI, which provides:
That in the trial of any impeachment the Presiding Officer of the
Senate, if the Senate so orders, shall appoint a committee of Senators to
receive evidence and take testimony at such times and places as the
committee may determine.108
Charles Black disapproved of this measure, arguing that the text of Article
I—“the Senate shall have the sole Power to try all impeachments”—left no
scope for subgroups.109 His views were not rejected in United States v. Nixon so
much as left open, when the Supreme Court accepted the argument that the
106.

THOMAS J. WICKHAM, CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON’S MANUAL, AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 114-192 (2017).
107. This does not mean that the offenses for which a President may be impeached are identical to
those for judges (or for other civil officers), and the Senate acquittal in the Clinton
impeachment would appear to reject this proposition. See infra Section II.G.
108. RULES OF PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE IN THE SENATE WHEN SITTING ON IMPEACHMENT
TRIALS, S. DOC. NO. 104-1 (1996).
109. See BLACK & BOBBITT, supra note 18, at 12-13 (referring to the “dubious constitutionality” of
an evidence or testimony committee).
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Senate’s power to try impeachments included the nonreviewable discretion to
determine how to conduct its trials.110 This is consistent with the court’s
jurisprudence that it should avoid expressing opinions on matters delegated to
other branches. During the Clinton impeachment trial, evidence was presented
to the whole Senate, not to a Rule XI committee, and so it is probably correct to
say that the constitutionality of such committees—at least where the presidency
is at stake—remains untested. The Senate may well be the ﬁnal determinant of
its own rules, but its recent practice suggests some ambivalence about
employing Rule XI procedures in a presidential impeachment.
The impeachment and acquittal of Bill Clinton in 1998-99 are the only
comprehensive precedents for the impeachment process since the impeachment
and acquittal of Andrew Johnson in 1868, which was itself the ﬁrst
impeachment of the president since the creation of the office of the presidency
in 1789. Accordingly, the Clinton debacle, from which no one walked away
unscathed, will shape the development of the impeachment clauses more than
any other events to date, including the Nixon resignation. This development
gives reason for concern, for it reﬂects the effects of concerted attempts to
criminalize American politics, weaponizing our legal processes by evading or
even discarding the constitutional bases of those processes. Clinton’s
impeachment may be partly responsible for the contempt in which many
Americans hold their political institutions.
D. Bush and the Iraq War
On February 19, 2008, the New Hampshire House of Representatives took
up House Resolution 24, a bill to petition Congress to commence impeachment
proceedings against President George W. Bush and his vice-president, on
charges that included taking the United States to war against Iraq. The New
Hampshire House had heard testimony supporting “a legal theory that a state
legislature can in fact force the US House to begin impeachment
proceedings.”111 This theory was based on “section 603 of Jefferson’s Manual of
Parliamentary Practice [which] states that an impeachment may be set in

110.
111.

Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 238 (1993).
H.R. 24, 2008 Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2008), http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us
/legislation/2008/HR0024.html [https://perma.cc/E3V8-WDPA]; Timothy Horrigan, I
Testiﬁed in Favor of Impeaching Bush & Cheney, TIMOTHY HORRIGAN (Feb. 19, 2008),
http://www.timothyhorrigan.com/documents/impeach-bush.080219.html [https://perma
.cc/NM4M-QS27].
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motion by the United States House of Representatives by charges transmitted
from the legislature of a state.”112
The New Hampshire proceedings appear to have arisen from several
embedded confusions. Jefferson’s Manual was created from materials he
assembled and used as an aid when presiding over the US Senate.113 They
included notes he took while a student at William and Mary College as well as
his comments on British parliamentary procedure, and he augmented them
throughout his tenure as vice president. He published them as a single work,
intended for future vice-presidents, in 1801; a second edition with added
material was printed in 1812.114 Although prepared for the US Senate, the
Manual was formally incorporated by the House of Representatives into its
rules in 1837.115
The sponsors of the New Hampshire resolution calling for the
impeachment of President Bush appeared to have relied on House commentary
on Jefferson’s Manual, not as they claimed on his actual text. That text provides
that “the Commons, as the grand inquest of the nation, becomes suitors for
penal justice. The general course is to pass a resolution containing a criminal
charge against the supposed delinquent, and then to direct some member to
impeach them by oral accusation, at the bar of the House of Lords, in the name
of the Commons.”116 The commentary adds that “in the House various events
have been credited with setting an impeachment in motion: . . . A resolution
introduced by a Member and referred to a committee . . . ; Charges transmitted
from the legislature of a State or territory or from a grand jury; or facts
developed and reported by an investigating committee of the House.”117
There are several problems here: the text relied upon is not Jefferson’s
Manual; even if it were, the Manual is an authority for the rules of the House
only to the extent that these have not been modiﬁed by later precedents; and in
any case the Manual was written for the Senate and is largely a commentary on
112.
113.

114.

115.
116.
117.

Id.
THOMAS JEFFERSON, JEFFERSON’S MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE, https://www.gpo
.gov/fdsys/pkg/HMAN-112/pdf/HMAN-112-jeffersonman.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y5HU
-3CDX].
Wendell H. Ford, A Note About This Edition of THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF
PARLIAMENTERY PRACTICE FOR THE USE OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, at xi (1993),
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/SDoc103-8.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T6H4-8TQN].
Id. at xii.
H. DOC. NO. 114-192, at 319 § 602.
Id. at 319 § 603. The version of the Jefferson Manual in effect in 2008 contained the same
relevant text. H. DOC. NO. 109-157, at 316 § 603 (2007).
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British parliamentary practices of the time, which, with respect to the grounds
for impeachment, are quite irrelevant. Furthermore, no rule of the House could
possibly force the House to commence impeachment proceedings. House rules
can always be changed or amended by the members, and more importantly,
any compulsion is probably incompatible with the provision of Article I,
section 2, clause 5 that the “House of Representatives shall have the sole Power
of Impeachment.”118 Perhaps for these reasons, some commentators have
mocked the New Hampshire resolution and its sponsors.119
This would be a mistake. While it was an error to purport to rely on
Jefferson’s Manual, the commentary on the Manual on which the authors of the
resolution should have relied is, if anything, more relevant than the original
provisions of the Manual. That commentary cites Volume 3 of Hinds’ Precedents
of the House of Representatives of the United States, sections 2469 and 2319, which
do indeed appear to offer precedents in which referrals from the legislature of a
state or territory have served as the basis for Congressional consideration of an
impeachment inquiry.120
On February 20, 2008, the New Hampshire bill was ruled “Inexpedient to
Legislate,” and it was tabled on April 16, never to be revived.121 But in an era in
which the federalism of the US constitutional structure has empowered more
assertive state legislatures, and as the US population continues to sort itself
geographically by political and cultural preferences, this route to impeachment
may someday be reactivated.
E. Obama and Executive Discretion
Two developments—the appearance of cities and states that refuse to
cooperate with federal immigration officials, and the legalization of marijuana
by many states despite federal narcotics laws criminalizing its use—are
harbingers of a deeper change in the constitutional order of the American State,

118.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
119. Jeff Chidester, New Hampshire to Vote on Impeachment, A RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY (Apr.
9, 2008), https://arendezvouswithdestiny.blogspot.com/2008/04/new-hampshire-to-vote
-on-impeachment.html [https://perma.cc/FDR7-H8Z4].
120. H. DOC. NO. 114-192, at 319 § 602. But it should be noted that in neither case was the
individual actually impeached—and in one case the Congress actually decided not to even
investigate the matter.
121. 30 N.H. HOUSE REC. 21 (N.H. Mar. 14, 2008), http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/house
/caljourns/calendars/2008/houcal2008_21.html [https://perma.cc/4RED-RUS2]; 30 N.H.
HOUSE REC. 31 (N.H. Apr. 16, 2008), http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/house/caljourns
/journals/2008/houjou2008_31.html [https://perma.cc/RE2B-RW3R].
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to which I alluded in the preceding section. The increasing polarization and
paralysis of Congress only speeds this change. What if the president, unable to
push his reform agenda through the Congress, simply refused to enforce the
laws he could not get repealed? Would that constitute an impeachable offense?
One of the proposed charges drafted by the House Judiciary Committee at
the time of the Nixon impeachment was the claim that the president had
refused to spend appropriated funds122 for projects and operations to which he
was opposed on grounds of policy but that had been passed over his opposition
and sometimes his veto.123 This charge of “impoundment” turned on the
president’s intent. It was not uncommon for presidents to decline to spend
funds authorized by the Congress; Thomas Jefferson had done so in 1803,124
and the power was generally regarded as inherent in the executive.125
Jefferson’s case involved his refusal to spend money authorized for the
acquisition of warships for the US Navy. He reported that “the favorable and
peaceable turn of affairs on the Mississippi rendered an immediate execution of
[the authorized funds] unnecessary.”126 Nixon, however, used impoundment
to override congressional policies with which he disagreed. He had tried to
impound funds for an environmental project that he had opposed and then
vetoed, and to which his veto had been overridden.127 In the end, the Judiciary
Committee refused to forward to the whole House the charge of impoundment
as a separate impeachable offense. Later, in Train v. City of New York (1975), the
Supreme Court held that the impoundment power cannot be used as a kind of
irrefutable veto.128

122.

123.

124.

125.

126.
127.
128.

See Norman Pine, The Impoundment Dilemma: Crisis in Constitutional Government, 3 YALE
REV. L. & SOC. ACTION 99 (1973) (describing the Nixon Administration’s refusal to spend
funds that Congress had appropriated).
Richard Nixon, Veto of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, AM.
PRESIDENCY PROJECT, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=3634 [https://
perma.cc/K2AS-FZKS].
Letter from Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General of the United States, to Sam J. Ervin, Jr.,
Chairman, Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of S. Comm. on the Judiciary (July 26,
1973),
https://www.gao.gov/products/475952#mt=e-report
[https://perma.cc/AD28
-Z2R4].
3 ALBERT GALLATIN, THE WRITINGS OF ALBERT GALLATIN 117 (H. Adams ed., 1879); 7
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 256-57 (H. Lodge ed., 1904);
4 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 529-30, 533 (H. Washington
ed., 1854).
13 THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES: EIGHTH
CONGRESS 12-14 (1852).
Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 35 (1975).
Id. at 48-49.
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For my part, I believed at the time that impoundment could provide a
strong predicate for impeachment when the president used his discretionary
power over expenditures for the purpose of dismantling or crippling programs
regularly enacted in lawful form. Charles Black, however, was careful to call
this a “gray area.”129 The president might think that if cuts were needed to
ensure ﬁscal stability, they ought to come where they might be least hurtful.
Moreover, Black noted, many appropriation statutes authorize but do not
mandate spending. Anticipating Train, he concluded that the president might
believe that by impounding funds he was merely referring a doubtful matter to
the courts.130
The Obama presidency was criticized for a not dissimilar tactic: using its
prosecutorial discretion to decline to enforce statutes with which the president
disagreed. In 2009, the Department of Justice simply ceased enforcing federal
narcotics laws against persons whose actions complied with “existing state laws
providing for the medical use of marijuana.”131 But the most far-reaching of
the administration’s actions in this vein was the president’s decision,
announced on June 15, 2012, not to enforce the removal provisions of the
Immigration and Nationality Act against an estimated 800,000 to 1.76 million
persons who were illegally present in the United States.132
The criteria used by the Obama administration tracked those proposed by
the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act (DREAM Act),
ﬁrst proposed in 2001, which Congress had repeatedly failed to adopt.133 The
constitutional problem for such a presidential strategy arises from Article II,
section 3, which provides that the president shall “take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.” In the words of an early nineteenth-century commentator,
William Rawle, “Every individual is bound to obey the law, however
129.

BLACK & BOBBITT, supra note 18, at 39.
Id.
131. Memorandum for Selected United States Attorneys from David W. Ogden, Deputy Attorney
Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice 2 (Oct. 19, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ﬁles
/opa/legacy/2009/10/19/medical-marijuana.pdf [https://perma.cc/PY8M-U6LX].
132. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., to David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs and Border Prot. (June 15, 2012),
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals
-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf [https://perma.cc/2LCE-GC4B].
133. The Administration’s program, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) is the
executive version of the legislation known as the DREAM Act. As of September 2017,
690,000 persons had registered through DACA. Gustavo Lopez & Jens Manuel Krogstad,
Key Facts About Unauthorized Immigrants Enrolled in DACA, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 25, 2017),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/09/25/key-facts-about-unauthorized
-immigrants-enrolled-in-daca [https://perma.cc/75HQ-5SQU].
130.
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objectionable it may appear to him: the executive power is bound not only to
obey, but to execute.”134 There seems to have been from the very beginning of
our constitutional life a consensus that the Take Care Clause imposed a duty on
the president to enforce laws whether or not he considered them wise as a
matter of policy.
This view of the Take Care Clause is strengthened by the broad language of
the Vesting Clause that puts in the hands of the president all “executive
Power”135—in contrast to the language of Article I, which gives the Congress
only those “legislative Powers herein granted,”136 and the even more restricted
judicial power of Article III.137 In light of Article II’s broad grant of power, the
Take Care Clause can scarcely be an additional grant of authority, and instead is
generally read to underscore the responsibility of the president to exercise his
power to ensure that the laws of the United States are actually executed.
This construction is further strengthened by the Presidential Oath Clause,
which prescribes the following: “I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States . . . ”138
Finally, the history of the adoption of the Take Care Clause at Philadelphia
further supports the view that this clause requires the president to enforce the
laws adopted by Congress regardless of his view of their merits (excepting
constitutionality). As the inﬂuential Framer James Wilson, who introduced
and advocated the principal ideas of Article II,139 put it some years later, the
clause established that the president has “authority, not to make, or alter, or
dispense with the laws, but execute an act of the laws, which [are]
established.”140
None of this is to deny that an ineradicable element of the executive
function is discretion and the prerogative to carry out the purpose of statutes as
effectively as possible. As with impoundment, however, it is a matter of intent.
If the president concludes that a lack of available personnel, or contradictory
directions from Congress, or changed circumstances compel him to give

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 147 (2d
ed. 1829).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
See Daniel J. McCarthy, James Wilson and the Creation of the Presidency, 17 PRESIDENTIAL
STUD. Q. 689 (1987).
2 JAMES WILSON, Lectures on Law: Of the Executive Department, in THE WORKS OF THE
HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON 183, 191 (Clark, N.J., Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2005) (1804).
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priority to the enforcement of some provisions and not others, that is one
thing. If his argument is not made in good faith, it follows almost ineluctably
that the laws have not been “faithfully” executed. As two critics of the
administration put it, “for if the president can refuse to enforce a federal law
against the class of 800,000 to 1.76 million individuals, what discernible limits
are there to prosecutorial discretion? . . . Can a president who wants tax cuts
that a recalcitrant Congress will not enact decline to enforce the income tax
laws? Can a president effectively suspend the environmental laws by refusing
to sue polluters, or workplace and labor laws by refusing to ﬁne violators?”141
F. Before and After
When Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist #65 that the jurisdiction of
impeachment covers “offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public
men, or, in other words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust,”142
did he mean that the actions for which an official can be impeached must take
place while that person is in office? Presumably a private person—perhaps even
one seeking office—is not yet a public person. On this line of thinking, an
impeachable offense may be committed only by someone who can be
impeached—just as the Code of Military Conduct can be violated only by
someone who is or has been in the armed forces.143 There must be someone to
whom the prohibition applies when the act occurs; and by this reasoning, the
impeachment of a public official cannot be based on her acts before entering
public life.
Supporting this view is the ordinary construction we give to the term
“high” in the phrase “high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” Like the notorious
High Sheriff of Nottingham, or the Lord High Executioner of Gilbert and
Sullivan, this term here applies to government officials and their duties. Just as
we must distinguish “high Crimes and Misdemeanors” from the ordinary
crimes found in statute books, we must be equally careful in determining who
precisely is subject to these prohibitions.
It should be noted that in the precedents of the Nixon and Clinton
impeachments, the House Judiciary Committee took care to exclude Articles of

141.

Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement
of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 784
(2013).
142. THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, supra note 58, at 396 (Alexander Hamilton).
143. 10 U.S.C. § 802(a) (2018); see also Exec. Order 10,631, 20 Fed. Reg. 6057 (Aug. 17, 1955)
(Code of Conduct for members of the Armed Forces of the United States).
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Impeachment that arose from acts that occurred before their subjects took
office.144
Those who argue that acts prior to assuming the presidency are relevant to
impeachment note that people seeking the office of president must submit to
many legal restrictions as to how they run their campaigns, receive money,
what their ﬁnancial disclosures must report, and so forth. If not uncovered
during the campaign, violations of such restrictions should be a matter for
Congress, it is said, once the conspiracy is exposed. There’s something to this,
but I don’t think that consideration necessarily lies in the role of Congress as
the assessor of the legal culpability of the successful candidate—whose criminal
conduct, at any rate, can always be prosecuted in the criminal system, even if
this must wait until the end of his term.
Some also argue that offenses committed by the civilian, if they are serious
enough, would if discovered render the office of the presidency nonviable. Of
course that may be true, but this nonviability seems to be political rather than
legal, and thus a matter for public judgment, not for trial by a coordinate
branch of the government. A congressional judgment of nonviability would
bring us perilously close to making maladministration a ground for
impeachment—a basis that was decisively rejected at the Constitutional
Convention. And ﬁnally it is urged that once in office a president can make
investigation of his earlier offenses difficult and time-consuming even if the
initial disclosure of these offenses has otherwise undermined his legitimacy.
Invoking executive privilege and relying on his authority to control the work of
the Department of Justice, a president could rescue an administration that is
foundering and ought to be dispensed with. So it is argued that impeachment
must be available as a remedy even though the original acts which now
occasion such contempt occurred before the inauguration. However strong a
motive the exposure of earlier misdeeds might provide for public impatience or
even revulsion, it scarcely satisﬁes a legal standard for prosecution and
conviction to say that a great many voters are experiencing buyer’s remorse.
Our institutions, based on a respect for the rule of law, demand that mercurial
judgments of approval are insufficient to overturn the constitutional mandate
of a presidential election. Moreover, obstruction that was itself official
misconduct could still provide a basis for impeachment even though the
incident of the obstruction was not itself an official act, that is, occurred before
the president assumed office.
144.

I think this argument proves too much, although I’m not persuaded that its opposite—that
the subject of impeachment was a public or private citizen at the time of the alleged acts for
which he is to be punished is irrelevant—is correct, either. Here, also, its advocates
oversimplify out of a desire for a bright-line rule.
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Before offering what I believe to be the best rule to resolve the before/after
dilemma, let us look at an actual historical case rather than a series of
hypotheticals: the incident of the so-called Chennault Affair that received
renewed attention in 2017.
In the autumn of 1968, encouraged by Soviet channels, President Lyndon
Johnson decided to offer Hanoi a complete cessation of US bombing in
Vietnam, believing that, for the ﬁrst time, the North Vietnamese were willing
to agree to the basic framework the Johnson administration insisted was a
precondition for American withdrawal.145 Having made his decision, he
discovered that the Nixon campaign was sending messages to the South
Vietnamese ambassador via a prominent Asian-American Republican activist,
Anna Chennault.146 These messages encouraged the Saigon government to
refuse to participate in the peace talks then under way by promising that a
Nixon administration would take a harder line against Hanoi.147 Johnson
ordered government surveillance of Chennault, the South Vietnamese embassy
in Washington, and the president of South Vietnam’s offices in Saigon.148
The LBJ Presidential Library has made available tapes of conversations
between Johnson and Senator Richard Russell that disclose Johnson’s
awareness of Nixon’s conspiracy. Johnson received FBI surveillance reports
detailing contacts between Chennault and the South Vietnamese ambassador
in which she advised him she had received a message from Nixon saying,
“Hold on. We are going to win . . . . Please tell your boss [the South
Vietnamese president] to hold on.” LBJ is also recorded telling Everett Dirksen,
the Republican leader of the Senate, “I’m reading their hand, Everett. This is
treason,” to which Dirksen replied, “I know.”149
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Although the election was only days away, Johnson refused to take these
revelations to the public.150 Perhaps he feared that the administration’s
surveillance of an ally and a candidate for the presidency would poison his
successor’s presidency, whoever won the election. Without conclusive proof of
Nixon’s knowledge or collusion that he could make public, Johnson spoke to
Nixon directly. “I would never do anything to encourage [Saigon] not to come
to the table,” Nixon told Johnson.151 In a famous interview, he later elaborated:
“I did not authorize [Chennault] and I had no knowledge of any contact with
the South Vietnamese at that point . . . . I couldn’t have done that in
conscience.”152 But notes taken by H. R. Haldeman, Nixon’s chief of staff,
suggest that Nixon was in fact the mastermind behind the conspiracy.153 These
notes record Nixon’s direction to Haldeman on October 19 that the South
Vietnamese president was feeling “tremendous pressure” from Johnson and
that the South Vietnamese wanted the Republicans to determine what the
“quid pro quo” would be for their cooperation in stalling the peace talks.154
Nixon said, “Keep Anna Chennault working on South Vietnam.”155
What might have happened in the war, or in the election, if this conspiracy
had been exposed, one cannot say.
The Chennault Affair contains many strands that my brief account
necessarily ignores, but let us assume that the charge against Nixon is accurate:
while running for the presidency in 1968, he persuaded a foreign government
to delay peace negotiations in order to advance his candidacy. This gives us a
paradigm case, because it involves an attempt to pervert the course of an
election. Does it matter whether Nixon would have lost the election had his
schemes been unsuccessful, or whether he actually swayed the South
Vietnamese? Is it enough that he believed the election was in the balance and
that his conspiracy might make the difference in a very close race (which it
was)156? In such a case, the before/after distinction seems beside the point. The
constitutionally signiﬁcant elements in the conspiracy are not conﬁned to
Nixon’s subsequent acts in public office but clearly include the effects on a
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

155.
156.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
John A. Farrell, When a Candidate Conspired with a Foreign Power to Win an Election,
POLITICO (Aug. 6, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/08/06/nixon
-vietnam-candidate-conspired-with-foreign-power-win-election-215461 [https://perma.cc
/XX4G-HDKV].
Farrell, supra note 149.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showelection.php?year=1968
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public event of great constitutional signiﬁcance—a presidential election.
Perverting the course of an election—or attempting to do so—either by illicit
means, such as stealing documents in an effort to embarrass an opponent (as in
Watergate), or improper means, such as torpedoing peace negotiations by the
existing government, cries out for a clear rule. During the 1787 Philadelphia
Convention, Virginia delegate George Mason asked, “Shall the man who has
practiced corruption and by that means procured his appointment in the ﬁrst
instance, be suffered to escape punishment, by repeating his guilt?”157 What
rule do we apply if we don’t know whether the office was in fact successfully
procured by corrupt means? Suppose Nixon would have won anyway? Suppose
his collaborators in Saigon didn’t need any further incentives to frustrate the
Johnson peace talks?
The sensible rule ought to be that when a substantial attempt is made by a
candidate to procure the presidency by corrupt means, we may presume that he
at least thought this would make a difference in the outcome, and thus we
should resolve any doubts as to the effects of his efforts against him. Yet we
must conﬁne the operation of such a rule to truly substantial constitutional
crimes, lest we ensnare every successful campaign in an unending postmortem
in search of nonconstitutional misdeeds.
On this rule, the president could not be impeached for insider trading in
securities, or for a narcotics violation if these occurred before he entered the
White House. Doubtless there are middle cases that may or may not provide
grounds for impeachment, such as a conspiracy to disturb the course of justice
by promising pardons to win political support of their beneﬁciaries (which
may amount to bribery) or concocting tax fraud schemes. These crimes would
affect government operations, but unless the president takes some official act
once he is in office, they do not in themselves amount to the constitutional
crimes envisaged by our Framers and ratiﬁers.
This rule of construction also avoids an otherwise absurd conundrum:
conspiracy with agents of a foreign state is not a problem before an election
because there is no crime of electoral collusion on the federal statute books, but
the obstruction of an investigation after an election also poses no problem for
the conspirator because although it is a crime, a sitting president cannot be
prosecuted158 and could thus serve out his term.

157.

2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 105, at 65.
158. See infra text accompanying notes 212.

547

the yale law journal forum

November 26, 2018

ii. chapter eight: seven fallacies
Though much has changed in the practices of the US government and in
the expectations of the public since 1974, much abides. From the very
beginning of our life as a republic under a constitution ratiﬁed by our people,
there have been six fundamental methods taken from English common law by
means of which the Constitution has been applied. These six forms of
argument—history, text, structure, doctrine, prudence, and ethos—are
sometimes called “modalities,”159 the philosophical term for the ways in which
a proposition is determined to be true.160 In the constitutional law of the Unites
States these six modalities determine whether a proposition of constitutional
law is deemed to be true—whether the assertion of a particular constitutional
principle accurately states the law. Together these six archetypal forms of
argument compose the standard model by which judges, lawyers, officials, and
citizens determine the law of the Constitution.161 Indeed, that is the point of
this book: impeachment is a matter of constitutional law and for this reason
Charles Black’s analysis remains as potent today as when it was written, despite
the changes in American political society. One of these modalities—doctrine, or
precedent—is applied according to the rule that the latest in time by the most
authoritative source is dispositive. Thus the increased aggressiveness shown by
the House in 1999 is now part of our law as to what the House may lawfully
deem an impeachable offense. Another of the modalities—prudence, or the
calculation of cost and beneﬁts—also applies to a present context that is

159.

See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 11-12 (1991). Within the
constitutional context, each modality can help provide legitimacy to an argument by helping
us assess the validity of a particular constitutional interpretation. For example, in Berger v.
New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), a court assessing the constitutionality of wiretapping under
the Fourth Amendment employed a historical argument, which considers the ratiﬁers’
intentions, concluding that “[t]he purpose of . . . the . . . Fourth Amendment [is] to keep
the state out of constitutionally protected areas until it has reason to believe that a speciﬁc
crime has been or is being committed.” Id. at 59.
160. In logic, we determine whether the truth of a proposition is necessary, contingent, or
impossible by applying logical rules; in epistemology, we determine whether a proposition
is known, unknown, or known to be untrue by applying epistemic rules; in ethics, to say
that a proposition is obligatory, permissible, or forbidden is to apply a deontic mode. Thus,
the conﬂicts mentioned in the note above should not dismay us: a proposition that is true in
a deontic mode—thou shalt not kill—may not be the case in an epistemic mode—that
persons will in fact kill. Considering and reconciling modal claims is the mark of a civilized
human being.
161. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, How America’s Constitution Affirmed Freedom of Speech Even Before
the First Amendment, 38 CAP. U. L. REV. 503 (2010); Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and
the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 641 (2013).
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constantly shifting as the country’s social, political, and economic situation
changes. The public’s demand for inﬂuence on events, effectuated by polling or
social media, for example, and the media’s demand for greater transparency in
government, reﬂected in the deplorable anonymous release of conﬁdential
grand jury information, are as much the drivers of this change as they are its
manifestations.
Case law and political calculation, however, are not the only forms of
legitimate constitutional argument. Thus there are counter pressures to recent
developments to be found in the Federalist Papers (history); in Black’s lucid
technical mastery of the ways in which the terms of a legal document are
construed, like the rule of eiusdem generis (text); in the basic, though always
contested, relations between a Congress that may not remove the president
merely because a majority of its members have lost conﬁdence in the
administration, and the president who may not abuse his powers simply
because he is unable to work the machinery of legislation effectively
(structure); and in the tradition of the rule of law that is supreme over politics
where constitutional rules are to be applied (ethos). These modalities are just
as potent as doctrine and prudence, perhaps even more so when we are
searching for ﬁrmer ground as the earth moves beneath our feet.162
Moreover, even recent doctrine by an authoritative tribunal like the US
Supreme Court can be wrong because the court’s reasoning is found to be
ﬂawed. As a doctrinal matter, the limitation of Bush v. Gore163 to its own facts164

162.

And the earth is moving. There has been a global shift within countries in the twenty-ﬁrst
century from nation states toward market states. The nation state, a structure that dates
back to the second half of the nineteenth century, promises to improve the ﬁnancial wellbeing of its citizens against the backdrop of an open market and the equal rights. The period
was marked by an increase in enfranchisement, free education, public funding of science,
and other efforts that reﬂected nations’ presumptions that their citizens derived welfare
strictly from the state. In the twenty-ﬁrst century, however, there have been shifts towards
market states in response to international trade and communications, recognition of norms
of human rights, changes in warfare, and other changes. This new structure promises to
maximize opportunity, rather than material well-being, in exchange for being given power.
It enables and assists citizens’ choices rather than trying to direct them, and it changes the
type of warfare and defense that the state is able to engage in. For further discussion of this
transition from late-nineteenth and twentieth century industrial nation states to twenty-ﬁrst
century informal market states, see PHILIP BOBBITT, THE GARMENTS OF COURT AND PALACE:
MACHIAVELLI AND THE WORLD THAT HE MADE 172-76 (2013); PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND
CONSENT: THE WARS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 85-90 (2008); see also generally
PHILIP BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE AND THE COURSE OF HISTORY (2002).
163. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
164. See id. at 109 (“Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of
equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities.”).
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is a fatal admission of its vacuity as a precedent, and the Supreme Court has
never relied on the case since it was handed down. Or the decision may remain
contested because the various modalities point to different holdings. Even the
unanimous holding in Clinton v. Jones165 will not save it from ridicule because
of its prudentially naïve dismissal of the impact of a civil suit on the presidency.
These observations may sound like technical matters, or subjects more ﬁt for a
treatise on jurisprudence than a handbook on the methods of impeachment,
but they go to the heart of Black’s book: impeachment is a matter of decision
according to law, and there are some decisions we can make—according to the
law of the Constitution—that will guide us even in terrain where the law is
currently undecided. There are also some propositions of constitutional law
that are demonstrably false and can be shown to be so. It might be well to
dispose of them before we proceed to the application of constitutional law to
our contemporary predicaments.
I’ve chosen seven of the most seductive of these fallacies (some
constitutional scholars call them “myths”166). Clearing them away will help us
see the matter of impeachment more perspicuously. That some are widely and
tenaciously held does not validate them, but is rather an implicit criticism of
law professors and journalists whose job it is to inform and educate the public.
That many people believe them is, while troubling, not dispositive; as the
saying goes, ten times zero is still zero.
These fallacies are:
1. Impeachment is a political question, not a legal one.
2. The grounds for impeachment are whatever the House of
Representatives determines them to be by voting a Bill of
Impeachment and sending it to the Senate.
3. A criminal act by the president is an essential predicate to
impeachment.
4. Any serious criminal act by the president is grounds for
impeachment.
5. Congress cannot remove a president via impeachment for exercising
or declining to exercise authorities that are constitutionally
committed to the president’s discretion.
6. Acts authorized by Congress cannot provide a predicate for the
impeachment of the president who carries out these acts.
165.
166.

520 U.S. 681 (1997).
See Jane Chong, Impeaching Trump: Four Eternal Myths, LAWFARE (Sept. 1, 2017, 1:30 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/impeaching-trump-four-eternal-myths
[https://perma.cc
/S24F-7HNY].

550

impeachment: a handbook

7. What constitutes a “high Crime or Misdemeanor” does not vary
with the office of the person being impeached.
Sometimes these fallacies interlock. A person who thinks impeachment is a
political, not a legal, matter may be inclined to believe that customary legal
determinations like the assessment of motive or state of mind have no place in
an impeachment inquiry, and therefore she may also accept the fallacy that a
president cannot be impeached for his discretionary acts, whatever his
purposes. Similarly, believing that impeachment is a political rather than a legal
act gives grounds for concluding that an impeachable offense is whatever the
House claims it is.
One fallacy may also share an erroneous assumption with another. If you
think impeachment is fundamentally a response to the commission of an
ordinary crime, not a constitutional crime, you may be more likely to conclude
that impeachable offenses must be found in Title 18, “Crimes and Criminal
Procedure,” of the United States Code, and that Title 18 offenses provide a
sufficient basis for impeachment.
The reason these fallacies endure is simply that their perpetrators haven’t
bothered to apply the legal methods to correctly assess them, perhaps because
they don’t ultimately believe impeachment is a matter of law and indeed may
not believe that there is anything we can call “law” that is not politics. To
someone taking this position, it may be unpersuasive to retort that that belief is
incompatible with the US Constitution, which places law above political action
in Article VI (among other places), because to such a skeptic the Constitution
itself was little more than a snare for the gullible.167 But if that is the case, why
bother with impeachment? Why not just march to the White House and arrest
the president? And why should the president, who actually has armed forces at
his command, sit still for an impeachment proceeding if not out of deference to
the rule of law? Such views lead inevitably to violence and authoritarianism.
Once law has been swept away, there remains no restraint on the competition
for power. That these views are often urged by the advocates for the people
who would be most vulnerable in the face of such violence is merely an irony.

167.

See, e.g., JAMES D. ZIRIN, SUPREMELY PARTISAN: HOW RAW POLITICS TIPS THE SCALES IN THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2016); Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fetishism and the
Clinton Impeachment Debate, 85 VA. L. REV. 631, 656-59 (1999) (arguing that legislators’
avowedly constitutional positions in impeachment cases are merely partisan, and that all
constitutional interpretation of indeterminate standards is driven by political preference).
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A. Fallacy 1: Impeachment Is a Political Question, not a Legal One
John Tyler, a former Democrat from Virginia, was added to the Whig ticket
headed by William Henry Harrison in 1839. After succeeding to the presidency
upon Harrison’s death in 1841,168 he surprised many Whigs when he vetoed
two important groups of Whig legislation on policy grounds (as opposed to
constitutional grounds, which had hitherto generally been the basis for
presidential vetoes).169 On July 12, 1842, an impeachment resolution was
introduced in the House and a House select committee, headed by former
president John Quincy Adams, was formed to consider the issue. Though
Adams was a harsh critic of Tyler’s and appears to have been persuaded of the
necessity of eventual impeachment, he refused to press for the adoption of an
impeachment resolution on the grounds that it would have been defeated in
the Senate.170 This is the ﬁrst example of an impeachment attempt against a
president, and it appears to have been resolved on political rather than legal

168.

Prior to Tyler’s succession of Harrison upon the latter’s death, there was uncertainty
surrounding the degree to which a Vice President would assume the presidential powers if
the President were removed. Article II of the Constitution states that “In Case of the
Removal of the President from Office . . . the Same [Powers and Duties of the said Office]
shall devolve on the Vice President” who “shall act accordingly, until the Disability be
removed, or a President shall be elected.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. The ambiguity in the
terms left open the question of whether a Vice President would simply exercise the
presidential powers while remaining in his role, or whether he would fully assume the role
as President in his own right. When Tyler fully assumed the presidential power and role,
simultaneously vacating his vice-presidential powers of presiding over the Senate, he set a
clear and lasting precedent. Although now fully accepted precedent, the move was
controversial, against Harrison’s cabinet, who favored labeling Tyler as “Vice President,
acting as President,” and Whig party leaders, who also saw Tyler as only an “acting
president.” JOHN FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 6 (1992).
169. The reestablishment of a Bank of the United States was a central goal for the Whig party.
Tyler, however, was politically more inclined to give priority to state sovereignty and the
claims of the states against federal power to establish a national bank. While the Whig
leader Senator Henry Clay championed the creation of the bank, Tyler twice vetoed bills for
its creation: ﬁrst Clay’s bill, and later a similar bill passed by Congress. The Whig party so
strongly opposed Tyler’s actions regarding the bank that they responded by expelling Tyler
from the party. The impeachment proceeding against Tyler began after he again positioned
himself against the Whigs by vetoing a tariff bill for what he considered to be “the soundest
considerations of public policy,” according to his August 9, 1842 veto message. President
John Tyler, Veto Message Regarding Import Duties (Aug. 9, 1842), https://millercenter.org
/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/august-9-1842-veto-message-regarding-import
-duties [https://perma.cc/A6R2-Y5AT]. After a second veto of a tariff bill, Tyler ﬁnally
agreed to the bill that ultimately became the Tariff Act of 1842.
170. Lonnie E. Maness & Richard D. Chesteen, The First Attempt at Presidential Impeachment:
Partisan Politics and Intra-Party Conﬂict at Loose, 10 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 51, 56 (1980).
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grounds. What constitutional support is there for such a resolution, that is, the
decision on political grounds not to go forward with an otherwise valid case for
impeachment?
First, the determinations to indict and to convict are made by two political
bodies, not by the courts. Second, as a matter of recent precedent, there is
ample evidence that most commentators in the Congress and the media today
assume that the impeachment question is “more political than legal,” though
the basis for this belief is rarely stated. Third, the passage of the Seventeenth
Amendment, which took the selection of senators out of the hands of state
legislatures and gave it directly to the voters, has suggested to some that for the
Senate to resolve an impeachment indictment by the House on legal rather
than political grounds would create a “countermajoritarian difficulty”—
meaning that it would risk thwarting the will of the popular majority.171
Fourth, and possibly most inﬂuential, is the idea that law is just politics
anyway,172 and appeals to constitutional legal standards are little more than a
charade, a cover for the reliance on political calculation. As a prominent
constitutional lawyer put it in the New York Times in 2013,
Law is just politics by a different name, and most Supreme Court
justices are result-oriented, and choose legal theories (originalism,
judicial activism and the like) as window dressing while they go where
they want to go. Although these illusory labels can be treated as serious
methodologies and may be of interest to law professors, the American
legal system [is] just another part of government neither higher nor
lower than the other two branches, and one that must be muscled.173
Well, if that is true of the judicial system, what hope is there for the
Congress when its members are called upon to act as judges and jurors? Finally,
there is the Clinton precedent, which suggests that the acquittal of the
171.

172.
173.

See, e.g., Athanasia Livas, Impeachment and the Seventeenth Amendment: The Majoritarian Difficulty (December 3, 2017) (unpublished paper) (on file with author). The
countermajoritarian objection to judicial review is premised on the majoritarian belief that
a democracy’s legitimacy arises from its ability to carry out the majority’s will. The
objection states that the power of judicial review undermines the democracy’s legitimacy on
the basis that appointed judges are able to undermine or overturn laws passed by the elected
legislature. For the classic exposition of this theory, see ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962). However, this
objection overlooks the fact that judicial review preserves the legitimacy of the Constitution,
thereby protecting democratic representation. It is also important to notice that the
Constitution itself places boundaries on some majoritarian notions.
See Philip Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1233 (1989).
Martin Garbus, Letter to the Editor, Law and Politics, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2013), http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/05/26/books/review/law-and-politics.html [https://perma.cc
/KA36-LX9M].
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president, on charges whose legal grounds were admittedly slight, was
ultimately determined by his popularity with the public, which itself was based
on factors that could scarcely be called legal.
Against the view that impeachment is principally or wholly a political
matter is an important exchange at the Constitutional Convention—even
though this exchange is frequently misconstrued to provide support for the
claim that impeachment is not a legal matter. This exchange occurred when
George Mason objected to limiting the grounds for impeachment to bribery
and treason—the original formulation.174 He proposed adding the term
“maladministration” which appeared in six of the thirteen state constitutions as
a ground for impeachment, including that of Mason’s own state of Virginia.
After James Madison objected to the vagueness of “maladministration,” Mason
substituted “high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” This phrase is deﬁned in
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England—a book the Framers knew
well—as including, among other things,175 maladministration, and so quite a
few persons have concluded that, at least to this extent, there is a permissible
political basis for impeachment. In fact, the reason Madison gave for his
objection to this term was that it would make the presidency equivalent to “a
tenure during the pleasure of the Senate.” But if the House may not impeach a
president on grounds so general that they amount to his service at the mere
consent of the Senate (as, for example, a prime minister can be removed by
failing to win a vote of conﬁdence in Parliament), then mere political grounds
for impeachment cannot be the mandate of the Constitution.
Moreover, if the language is in some contexts open to competing
constructions, there is one thing the text does not provide. As Akhil Amar has
astringently noted, “The Constitution does not say that a president may be
ousted when half the House and two-thirds of the Senate want him out.”176
In addition to these historical and textual arguments, there is the powerful
precedent that since 1789, only nineteen federal officials have been impeached
by the House, and of these only eight have been convicted by the Senate. Of the

174.

2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 105, at 550 (“Why is the provision restrained to Treason &
bribery only? Treason as deﬁned in the Constitution will not reach many great and
dangerous offenses. Hastings is not guilty of Treason. Attempts to subvert the Constitution
may not be Treason as above deﬁned—As bills of attainder which have saved the British
Constitution are forbidden, it is the more necessary to extend: the power of
impeachments.”).
175. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *121 (“The ﬁrst and principal [high misdemeanor]
is the mal-administration of such high officers, as are in public trust and employment. This is
usually punished by the method of parliamentary impeachment . . . .”).
176. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION TODAY 300 (2016). But see Klarman, supra note 167.
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eight persons impeached and convicted, all were judges, and none were
indicted on political grounds. In the same period, only two presidents—
Andrew Johnson and Bill Clinton—were tried by the Senate, and neither was
found guilty. As Jane Chong observes, for “35 percent of our history, a US
president has coexisted with a House controlled by the opposing party (that’s
80 of the past 228 years since the start of the Washington administration) . . . .
[O]nly two presidents have suffered the disgrace of impeachment. Those
two . . . were Democrats who were each ultimately acquitted by a Republicancontrolled Senate.”177 If the grounds for impeachment were political, one
would expect it to be used more often for partisan reasons.
Finally, a passage from the Federalist Papers, often quoted out of context,
appears to support the conclusion that impeachment is a political matter but
actually does no such thing. This is the observation by Alexander Hamilton in
Federalist #65 that “the subjects of [impeachments] are of a nature which may
with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chieﬂy to
injuries done immediately to the society itself.”178
Read in context, however, Hamilton’s reﬂection has the opposite import to
that for which it is so often cited. In #65, Hamilton is at pains to show that the
Senate can act in “their judicial character as a court for the trial of
impeachments.”179 Indeed he introduces the paper by saying that he will
conclude his discussion “with a view of the judicial character of the Senate.”180
A bit defensively, he continues,
[A] well constituted court for the trial of impeachments is an object not
more to be desired than difficult to be obtained in a government wholly
elective . . . . The prosecution of them, for this reason, will seldom fail
to agitate the passions of the whole community and to divide into
parties more or less friendly or inimical to the accused. In many cases it
will connect itself with pre-existing factions and will enlist all their
animosities, partialities, inﬂuence and interest on one side or on the
other; and in such cases there will always be the greatest danger that
the decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength of the
parties, than by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt.181

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Chong, supra note 166.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, supra note 58, at 396 (Alexander Hamilton).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The entire essay is an attempt to show that the Senate can overcome its
political nature as an elected body—chosen at the time by the members of the
state legislatures—and act as a proper “court for the trial of impeachments.”
That is why Hamilton goes to great lengths to show that the Supreme Court is
an inappropriate alternative—since it could be involved in subsequent criminal
proceedings against the impeached president—and thus cannot substitute for
the Senate.
Yet Justice Samuel Chase and President Andrew Johnson were impeached
on political grounds—and they were cases of “ﬁrst impression,” that is, they
were without precedent. What are we to make of this?
I think the resolution lies in differentiating the roles of the House and
Senate. While the grounds for impeachment must be legal in nature, the
decision whether to bring a Bill of Impeachment lies within the political
discretion of the House, as John Quincy Adams urged. This is an extension of
the analogy of the House proceedings to those of a grand jury, before which
prosecutors have considerable leeway in determining what charges to press and
which to decline to prosecute. The Senate, by contrast, sits as a law court: its
proceedings are convened and presided over by the chief justice of the Supreme
Court. More importantly, unlike the members of the House, senators take a
special oath in addition to the oath of office that commands their ﬁdelity to the
Constitution. This second oath binds each member of the Senate to swear to
“do impartial justice, according to the Constitution and laws: So help me
God.”182
B. Fallacy 2: The Grounds for Impeachment Are Whatever the House
Determines Them to Be
In 1968, President Lyndon Johnson nominated an associate justice to be
chief justice of the Supreme Court to ﬁll the vacancy created by the retirement
of Earl Warren.183 In an effort to block this appointment, ethical charges were
made against the nominee, Abe Fortas, that were sufficient to hold over the
vacancy until after the election of Richard Nixon.184 This maneuver set in train
a series of events,185 including the nomination and rejection of a capable
182.

S. DOC. NO. 104-1, at 184.
Filibuster Derails Supreme Court Appointment, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artand
history/history/minute/Filibuster_Derails_Supreme_Court_Appointment.htm [https://
perma.cc/4FLB-4CZA].
184. Id.
185. Indeed, we have not seen the end of this sequence yet; consider the Senate Majority Leader’s
refusal to hold hearings on the nomination of Judge Merrick Garland to the Supreme Court
183.
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appeals court judge, Clement Haynsworth, and then the rejection of his
replacement, Harold Carswell, on grounds that infuriated partisans of the
nominees.186 In the maelstrom of those conﬁrmation ﬁghts, the Republican
minority leader of the House, Gerald Ford, bruited the idea of impeaching the
most liberal member of the court, William O. Douglas.187 It has been suggested
that Ford thought a threatened impeachment could be a bargaining chip to be
traded to the Democrats to get them to abandon their opposition to the Nixon
nominees.188
To preempt the creation of a select committee, which would divert
jurisdiction from the Judiciary Committee, the Democratic chairman of that
committee contrived to have a resolution of impeachment introduced against
Douglas for “[h]igh crimes and misdemeanors and misbehavior in office.”189
Ford, perhaps in frustration at this maneuver, spoke on April 15, 1970, to
demand action by the Judiciary Committee. As to whether Douglas’s alleged
wrongs provided a sufficient basis for impeachment, Ford stated that “the only
honest answer is that an impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the
House of Representatives considers [it] to be at a given moment in history.”190
In his speech, Ford leveled ﬁve major charges against Douglas:
 Douglas had improperly failed to disqualify himself from the
obscenity cases of a publisher who had paid him $350 for an article
on folk singing that appeared in one of the publisher’s magazines;
 Douglas’s book, Points of Rebellion, violated standards of good
behavior and was “an inﬂammatory volume”;
 Evergreen magazine, which had published an excerpt from Points of
Rebellion, also printed pornography;

186.
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189.
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in 2016 on the grounds that delay could—as it did—deliver the seat to the choice of the next
President.
Bruce H. Kalk, The Making of “Mr. Justice Haynsworth”? The Rise, Fall, and Revival of Judge
Clement F. Haynsworth Jr., 117 S.C. HIST. MAG. 4, 5 & 26 (2016).
Marjorie Hunter, Ford Asks Douglas’s Ouster, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 1970), https://www
.nytimes.com/1970/04/16/archives/ford-asks-douglass-ouster-ford-calls-for-removal-of
-douglas-from.html [https://perma.cc/9KXG-2DP2].
RICHARD SACHS, LEG. RES. SERV., ROLE OF VICE-PRESIDENT DESIGNATE GERALD FORD IN THE
ATTEMPT TO IMPEACH ASSOCIATE SUPREME COURT JUSTICE WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 4-5 (Oct.
24,
1973),
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0023/1687418.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7M9M-YSYY].
H.R. Res. 920, 91st Cong. (1970).
116 CONG. REC. 11913 (1970) (statement of Rep. Ford).

557

the yale law journal forum

November 26, 2018

 Douglas had a relationship with a private foundation that had paid
him a director’s fee (a similar arrangement with a nonproﬁt
foundation had been the basis for charges against Fortas);
 the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, of which
Douglas was chairman, was a “leftish” organization and a focal
point for militant student unrest.191
Ultimately, the Judiciary Committee refused to support Douglas’s removal,
and the midterm elections, in which the Democrats gained seats, and Ford’s
own lack of enthusiasm for the project caused the impeachment effort to fade
away. But Ford’s off-the-cuff remark that the grounds for impeachment are
“whatever a majority of the House . . . considers [it] to be at a given moment”
is apparently imperishable. What support is there for this widely held view?
There seems to be only one argument in support of Ford’s claim. Because
the decision to impeach is not reviewable by a court, any vote to impeach must
go unexamined—it is argued—even if it is based on political or even personal
animus. A Bill of Impeachment that dispensed with valid legal charges
altogether would nevertheless be referred to the Senate for a trial, if the bill was
approved by a House majority.
Perhaps nowhere than in reply to this insidious argument is there greater
salience to Charles Black’s words in this book that “we have to divest ourselves
of the common misconception that constitutionality is discussable or
determinable only in the courts.”192 A corollary to this widely credited but
nonetheless destructive misconception seems to be that outside the process of
litigation in the courts, no government actor is bound by law.193 On the
contrary, using the modalities of constitutional argument I have described
earlier, it is possible for government officials—and the public and the media
that assess their actions—to determine the legality of those acts and their
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Richard Sachs, Role of Vice-President Designate Gerald Ford in the Attempt to Impeach Associate
Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, LIBR. CONGRESS (Oct. 24, 1973), https://www
.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0023/1687418.pdf
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192. BLACK & BOBBITT, supra note 18, at 22.
193. See Philip Bobbitt, The ACLU Goes to War, JUST SECURITY (Nov. 25, 2016), https://www
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constitutionality. In fact I would go further: it is incumbent upon the office
holders and citizens of a democratic republic to do so.
Consider for a moment some of the objections to Congressman Ford’s
maxim. If it were true, then the House could impeach a federal official on
account of her religious beliefs, despite the explicit provision of Article VI that
“no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualiﬁcation to any Office or
public Trust under the United States.”194 Moreover, members of the judiciary
would hold their posts at the pleasure of the Congress, in deﬁance of the
system of sequenced and linked powers of the tripartite structure of the federal
government.195 And as we have seen, Ford’s rule would contradict the intention
of the Framers and ratiﬁers that the basis for impeachment and removal from
office be founded on evidence of bribery, treason, or similar offenses against
the constitutional viability of the State.196
What could possibly be meant by the requirement that Congress is bound
by its oath to uphold the Constitution, if this applies only in adjudicated cases?
Could the House attach a bill of attainder (a legislative act declaring a speciﬁc
person guilty without trial)197 to the impeachment resolution forwarded to the
Senate? Could it violate the prohibition on ex post facto laws by inventing a
new high crime and misdemeanor—such as serving on the board of a “leftish”
think tank—that few reasonable people would have anticipated would
constitute grounds for removal by impeachment?
These points are so obvious that I must assume that they have not been
overlooked by the advocates for Ford’s dictum. Perhaps what these advocates
really believe is that a majority of the members of the House of Representatives
are prepared to lie about the true basis of their votes. But even if this were the
case, it is not as damaging as Ford’s claim that they needn’t bother to do so.
C. Fallacy 3: A Criminal Act by the President Is an Essential Predicate to His
Impeachment
Since 1936, virtually all successful judicial impeachments have involved
criminal behavior,198 but that is hardly dispositive of the question whether the

194.

A textual argument.
A structural argument.
196. An historical argument. See infra text accompanying note 212.
197. These legislative acts declare a person or persons guilty of a crime, generally treason,
without trial and are constitutionally prohibited. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9.
198. In the 19th century, the grounds for the impeachment of judges was conﬁned to
constitutional misdemeanors, as in the examples of Pickering, Chase, Peck, Delahay, and
195.
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same standard should be applied to the president. Although the text is
identical, the standards for impeachment of the president might well be unique
because the constitutional crimes that can be committed by a president are
unique. Moreover, the removal of the president reverses a national election (in
most cases) and thus is a far graver step in a democracy than the removal of a
single member of the judiciary.199
Ironically, it may be this fact of uniqueness, the sense that a grave, historic
step is being taken, that has intimidated members of the House, who may then
wish to defend themselves against charges of having acted arbitrarily by relying
on the explicit certainties of federal or state criminal codes. For example, one of
the most constitutionally consequential charges against Richard Nixon was his
use of the impoundment power—or “rescission”—as a super veto that could
not be overridden. Instead of rescinding expenditures of funds appropriated
and authorized by Congress owing to changed circumstances, as had been the
practice since Jefferson, Nixon simply refused to spend the funds when
appropriations were passed by the Congress over his veto.200 This is a
constitutional crime that only the president can commit; it is unlikely to be in
the statute books. Not only does it defy the Supreme Court’s holding in the
line item veto case,201 it takes that maneuver one step further by creating a veto
that cannot be overridden. Had succeeding presidents emulated Nixon,
impoundment would have unilaterally changed the allocation of powers
created by Articles I and II. Nevertheless, all of the charges against Nixon
adopted by the House were also common crimes. The House managers of the
case against Bill Clinton were also anxious to stress the criminal aspect of the

Humphreys; more recently, common crimes have provided the basis for impeachment, as in
the examples of Ritter, Claiborne, Hastings, Nixon, Kent, and Porteous. The cases of
Swayne (1904), Archbold (1912), English (1926), and Louderbach (1932) are ambiguous
insofar as the charges of abuse of power are mingled with allegations of common crimes and
thus are perhaps transitional precedents to the more recent cases.
199. See infra Section II.G.
200. See supra Section I.E.
201. The Line Item Veto Act of 1996 allowed the president to cancel certain spending and tax
beneﬁt measures within a bill without having to veto the entire bill. See Line Item Veto Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200 (1996). When President Clinton exercised this power to
cancel certain provisions of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat.
251, and the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 787, a case was brought
challenging the constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act. The Supreme Court held that
the Act was unconstitutional, as it allowed the President unilateral authority to change the
content of a statue, signing into law a statute whose text was not voted on by either House
of Congress, in violation of Article I, Section 7. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417
(1998).
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perjury charges leveled against him; they refused to include the abuse of power
allegations recommended to them by the independent counsel.
The erroneous assumption that commission of a crime is an essential
predicate for impeachment altered the course of the select committee to
investigate the Iran-Contra affair. Democrats in the House who were anxious to
impeach President Reagan felt compelled to demonstrate that he had been
aware of the transfer of funds from the sale of missiles by Israel to Iran into
accounts used to fund the Contra insurgency in Nicaragua, and thus that he
had committed the common crime of misappropriation. Given President
Reagan’s management style, this was a difficult assignment, but, far more
importantly, the effort to do so diverted the investigation away from the more
consequential constitutional crime committed by the president when he set up a
private covert action agency, run by the government but funded from private
funds, including those from foreign countries.202
Yet requiring investigators to show that a common crime has been
committed may be useful as a check on hyperpartisanship in the impeachment
process. Charles Black wrote that we “feel more comfortable when dealing with
conduct clearly criminal in the ordinary sense, for as one gets further from that
area it becomes progressively more difficult to be certain, as to any particular
offense, that it is impeachable.”203 But if this clarity and avoidance of partisan
behavior provide prudential reasons for such a requirement, the Clinton
impeachment does not support this surmise. All of the charges forwarded to
the Senate alleged crimes, but the actual vote in the House fell almost strictly
along partisan lines.204
One need only consider a few hypothetical cases to realize how inadequate
such a requirement would be for impeachment. What if the president required
that all cabinet members affirm their belief in the divinity of Christ? Or that he
devolved to his personal ﬁnancial adviser classiﬁed intelligence about
upcoming decisions of the Federal Reserve? Because the president can
declassify any material he wishes, there is nothing per se illegal about this.
202.

See supra Section I.B.
BLACK & BOBBITT, supra note 18, at 32.
204. All but ten of the ﬁfty-ﬁve Republican Senators voted “guilty” on the obstruction-of-justice
article of impeachment. Only ﬁve Republican Senators voted “not guilty” on the perjury
article. Meanwhile, every single Democratic Senator voted “not guilty” on both articles. See
145 CONG. REC. 2376-77 (1999). Prior to the vote, Senator Russell Feingold of Wisconsin
stood as the only Democratic Senator to vote against a motion by Senator Robert C. Byrd of
West Virginia to dismiss the charges against Clinton, and to support a motion to take
depositions from three witnesses. See 145 CONG. REC. 1397 (1999) (roll call votes on the
motions); 145 CONG. REC. 2383 (1999) (statement of Senator Feingold explaining his vote
on the motions).
203.
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What if the president announced that under no circumstances would he
respond to the invocation of NATO’s Article 5, which calls upon the signatories
to the North Atlantic Treaty to aid each other when they are attacked? Or
suspended habeas corpus after Congress had refused to do so and while
Congress was in session? Suppose a candidate for the presidency conspired
with foreign intelligence agencies to provide him with sophisticated data
analytics in order that they could more effectively assist his campaign. This
may or may not be a crime, depending on whether information from a foreign
government amounts to the “contribution or donation of money or other thing
of value” to the campaign,205 but it can scarcely be doubted that it is a high
crime in the circumstances of a presidential election. As Black wrote after
giving his own hypotheticals, “the limitation of impeachable offenses to those
offenses made generally criminal by statute is unwarranted—even absurd.”206
This conclusion accords with James Wilson’s observation that “our
President . . . is amenable to [the laws] in his private character as a citizen, and
in his public character by impeachment.”207 It is also consistent with Justice
Joseph Story’s conclusion that the harms to be reached by impeachment are
those “offensive acts which do not properly belong to the judicial character in
the ordinary administration of justice, and are far removed from the reach of
municipal jurisprudence.”208
D. Fallacy 4: Any Serious Criminal Act by the President Is Grounds for His
Impeachment
Perhaps because bribery and treason are crimes, some have inferred that
any crime could serve as the basis for impeachment of the president. This view
is inconsistent, however, with the notion of a “high crime.” Bribing a maître d’
to get a good table at a restaurant might excite an overzealous prosecutor, but it
could scarcely serve as a predicate for action by the House to remove a
president. Like treason, the impeachable offense of bribery—like other
impeachable offenses that are also common crimes—must be an act that
actually threatens the constitutional stability and security of the State.

205.

See 52 U.S.C. § 30121(1)(a) (2018).
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Here we have, fortunately, an important precedent, though not one decided
by a court. As Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in his own study of impeachment,
Grand Inquests: the impeachment acquittals of Justice Chase and President
Johnson were cases “decided not by the courts but by the United States
Senate.”209
Aaron Burr, vice-president during Jefferson’s ﬁrst term, killed Alexander
Hamilton in a duel on July 11, 1804. There is some dispute as to whether
Hamilton ﬁred into the air before being shot in the spleen and liver by Burr,
but there is no doubt that dueling was illegal both in New York, where both
men were residents and where Hamilton was taken to die, and in New Jersey,
where the duel took place. For the killing, Burr was indicted in both
jurisdictions. (In New York, dueling was a capital offense.)
Yet after ﬁrst ﬂeeing to South Carolina, Burr returned to Washington to
complete his term as vice-president. Not only was he not impeached by a
Congress controlled by the president, who despised him, but in his role as vicepresident, he subsequently presided over the ﬁrst impeachment, against the
Federalist judge Samuel Chase, and was given high marks for his judicial
temperament and impartiality.
When construing the Constitution on the grounds of historical argument,
we give great weight to the actions of the ﬁrst few Congresses and presidents
because they were familiar with the understandings on the basis of which our
people ratiﬁed the governing document. It is obviously true, with respect to
judges, that any serious crime is a sufficient predicate for bringing a Bill of
Impeachment; as we have seen, nine members of the judiciary have been
impeached, mainly on the basis of having committed common crimes. But
what about Burr? Whether we say that the vice-president stands with the
president, perhaps because he too is elected by the entire nation, or whether we
place him on some lesser pedestal nearer the judges, the fact that Burr was not
impeached suggests that at the very least a president cannot be lawfully
impeached for the commission of an ordinary crime—even murder. Charles
Black found it inconceivable that “a president who had committed murder
could not be removed by impeachment.”210 He came to this conclusion because
such a crime “would so stain a president as to make his continuance in office
dangerous to public order . . . . We could punish a traitorous or corrupt
president after his term expired; we remove him principally because we fear
he . . . is not thinkable as a national leader.”211
209.
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What looks like a paradoxical precedent can actually be harmonized with
the standards we have thus far derived. An impeachable offense is one that puts
the Constitution in jeopardy. This act might also be a common crime, but the
reason we impeach is not to punish common crimes. In the Burr case, the
insigniﬁcant role of the vice-president in that period, the nearness of his term’s
end, perhaps even the alienation between Burr and Jefferson all militated
against impeachment.
This analysis also explains Congress’s rough treatment of the judges. It
wasn’t simply because they had committed common crimes that they were
impeached and removed from office. Rather it was because having committed a
common crime, they had undermined their own ability to serve in the judiciary
where they must assess and render judgment on the common crimes of others.
Perhaps this is the place to reaffirm Black’s position that a serving president
must be impeached before he or she can be indicted and tried for an ordinary
crime. This point is made repeatedly in the Federalist Papers. In #65, Hamilton
observes that
the punishment, which may be the consequence of conviction upon
impeachment, is not to terminate the chastisement of the offender. After
having been sentenced to perpetual ostracism from the esteem and
conﬁdence, and honors and emoluments of his country; he will still be
liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law.212
This point is made again in Papers #69 and #77, which assert that the
president could not be prosecuted as a criminal until he had left office, a point
conﬁrmed in the ﬁrst Congress by both Oliver Ellsworth213 and Vice-President
John Adams.214
Moreover, as a prudential matter this surely cannot be an open question.
Does anyone really think, in a country where common crimes are usually
brought before state grand juries by state prosecutors, that it is feasible to
subject the president—and thus the country—to every district attorney with a
reckless mania for self-promotion? Have we forgotten Jim Garrison already?
Thus the question, which I will take up in the next chapter, whether a
president’s obstruction of the operations of the Department of Justice must
track the requirements of the criminal statutes that prohibit the obstruction of
justice in order to serve as the basis for impeachment, misses the point. As
Black observed, the constitutional signiﬁcance of the fact that an impeachable
212.
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offense may share elements with a common crime is only that judges and
executive officials are put on notice of the impropriety of certain acts.215
In any case, we no longer have to make this choice because the TwentyFifth Amendment allows us a way out. If a crime is sufficiently shaming as to
make the president “not thinkable as a national leader,” we may presume that
the vice-president and a majority of the principal officers of the executive
branch (or some other body that Congress has designated) have grounds to
declare that the president is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office. Should the president resist, Congress must determine whether the
president is ﬁt to continue in office. It may transfer his powers to the vicepresident by a two-thirds vote of both houses.
E. Fallacy 5: Congress Cannot Remove a President for Exercising Authorities that
Are Constitutionally Committed to His Discretion
Certain authorities are granted by Congress to the president, for instance
by the Authorization for the Use of Military Force after 9/11. In the next
chapter I will discuss whether Congress can impeach a president who acts
pursuant to such powers in the absence of countervailing statutes. But other
powers are granted directly to the president by the Constitution, including
those accorded to him as head of the executive departments and thus as chief
law enforcement officer, the pardon power, and authority over the armed forces
as commander in chief. Can Congress impeach a president for acts committed
pursuant to power that is exclusively his?
Interestingly, in light of the importance of the early Congresses, the House
in the ﬁrst session of the ﬁrst Congress discussed impeachment extensively.
The issue was whether the president had to return to the Congress for
permission to remove the head of an executive department appointed by him
and conﬁrmed by the Senate. If a cabinet appointment required the
participation of the Senate, did dismissal also require Senate action?
On the ﬂoor of the House, James Madison argued that the Constitution
vested the power of removal exclusively in the president. He went on to say
that this was “absolutely necessary” because “it will make him, in a peculiar
manner, responsible for [their] conduct.” This responsibility, Madison argued,
would “subject [the president] to impeachment himself, if he suffers them to
perpetrate with impunity High crimes or misdemeanors against the United
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States, or neglects to superintend their conduct, so as to check their
excesses.”216
This might seem a surprising position to those who hold the erroneous
view that the president has constitutional immunity from impeachment for his
discretionary exercise of powers granted him exclusively by the Constitution.
Those enticed by this fallacy draw support—if wrongly—from the
constitutional crisis that led to the impeachment of Andrew Johnson. By
adopting the Tenure of Office Act, Congress sought to require President
Johnson to seek senatorial consent before removing his secretary of war.
Johnson, citing the “power and authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution,” nevertheless removed Edwin Stanton, a Lincoln appointee,
without seeking or obtaining the Senate’s consent.217 The House cited this
action as grounds for Johnson’s impeachment. The ﬁrst Article of
Impeachment claimed that Johnson was “unmindful . . . [when he issued an
order] for the removal of Edwin M. Stanton” of the Constitution’s requirement
that the laws be faithfully executed.218 The general consensus today, ratiﬁed by
the Supreme Court in Myers v. United States,219 is that Madison and Johnson
were right. The president does not have to return to the Senate to remove an
executive official who was conﬁrmed by that body. Does this mean that the
power speciﬁcally allocated to the president grants him a kind of constitutional
immunity to impeachment for the exercise of that power?
It has been claimed, for example, that the president cannot be impeached
for acts that in another’s hands would amount to obstruction of justice—for
example, trying to dissuade the director of the FBI or the attorney general from
pursuing a particular criminal investigation—because the president has the
exclusive authority to direct the officials of the Justice Department to pursue
prosecutions. As a lawyer for the president pithily put it, “he cannot obstruct
himself.”220”
216.
217.
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Or can the president be impeached for according recognition to the
government of a foreign state? It seems obvious that the Congress could not
require the president to recognize a particular foreign state; that power is his
exclusively. How, then, could his exercise of such a power be the basis for
impeachment? How, in other words, can the Congress coerce the president via
impeachment to take steps that it would be unconstitutional for the Congress
to require by statute?
These questions are confused by failing to differentiate between the
exercise of a lawful power, and the unlawful exercise of such a power. For
example, the president could clearly be impeached were he to take bribes from
a foreign state in exchange for recognition. The grounds for impeachment lie
not in the exercise of the power per se but in its corrupt exercise. In Andrew
Johnson’s case, the claim wasn’t so much that the president had behaved
improperly in exercising his constitutional powers; on the contrary, those very
constitutional powers were at issue. If Johnson’s claim to have the exclusive
right to dismiss executive officials was correct, then to hold otherwise would
mean that the command to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed”
included executing laws that were unconstitutional—that is, laws that were not
US law.
But Johnson’s case, like the purchase of a pardon or the treasonous exercise
of the president’s power as commander in chief, is easy. What if a foreign
power somehow induced the president to order US-led forces in Syria to stand
aside when Kurdish forces allied with the United States were attacked? What if
the president, instead of ordering the Department of Justice to stop
investigating the White House, instead used his power over the CIA to direct
the Agency to mislead DOJ investigators? Let’s go back to Madison’s argument
for giving the president exclusive authority in the ﬁrst place. Madison argued
that such authority would ensure the president’s impeachment if he permitted
misconduct. This is in sympathy with James Wilson’s argument that the virtue
of locating executive authority in one person was that it would ensure his
accountability.221 That the president is responsible for the actions of executive
officials makes him responsible when these actions are unlawful, and makes
him impeachable when they are constitutional crimes. This leads us to
conclude that the constitutional crimes he directs others to commit can provide
the basis for his impeachment.

221.
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F. Fallacy 6: Acts Authorized by Congress Cannot Provide a Predicate for the
Impeachment of the President Who Carries out These Acts
A slightly different point from Wilson’s and Madison’s was raised by
Elbridge Gerry during the colloquy quoted in the previous section concerning
the impeachability of the president for his discretionary acts. Gerry said that a
president could not be impeached when he was “doing an act which the
Legislature has submitted to his discretion”222“—that is, when the president’s
power to perform the act is delegated by statute rather than exclusively
assigned to the executive by the Constitution. This raises the question of
whether Congress is estopped (prevented by its own acts) from pursuing an
impeachment in such circumstances. Suppose, having been fully informed by
the executive, Congress provided funds for a paramilitary covert action that
went horribly wrong. Surely the president could not be impeached for his
oversight of such an enterprise on the grounds that the undertaking was too
risky.
Similarly, it has been argued that a president’s violations of the
Emoluments Clause could readily be rebuffed by congressional legislation
against conﬂicts of interest. Does it make sense to use the drastic weapon of
impeachment when the Congress has refused the less consequential but equally
effective method of statutory action? Could the president argue that
congressional inaction—and implicit congressional complicity in the example
above—can mislead the president, even entrap him? This may be what Charles
Black had in mind when he wrote that the impeachment of Richard Nixon for
secret military operations in Cambodia, of which the leaders of the Congress
were well aware and to which they had not objected, was close to the line.
But a rule that estopped Congress from impeaching in such circumstances
would run afoul of one of the most basic precepts of the US Constitution: one
Congress cannot bind another to its decisions. One often hears politicians
promise that a particular statute will force Congress to live within certain
limits, such as a revenue cap at a certain percentage of GDP. Apart from the
moral suasion and the political reaction that might befall a transgressor, there is
no reason this should be true. A Congress cannot even bind itself, and it can
always repeal earlier action using the same procedures by which the earlier
legislation was adopted. A rule that prevented impeachment owing to prior acts
of congressional duplicity or even encouragement by the Congress would
amount to an unconstitutional, if ineffectual, restraint on future action by the
Congress.

222.
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Furthermore, impeachment and legislation, even when directed toward the
same object—to prevent corruption in the case of emoluments—are far
different modes of action. Statutory action has a policy purpose, correcting a
past wrong or deterring a future one; impeachment is a “National Inquest,” as
Hamilton termed it,223 that exposes constitutional crimes and has no particular
policy purpose other than protecting the State. A rule that estopped
congressional action would waive the public’s right to the exposure of
wrongdoing that comes with the trial (and the defense against such charges on
the grounds that the president has been unjustly accused).
The rule in such circumstances ought to be: Congress may impeach on
grounds that would be impeachable, regardless of any other congressional acts.
G. Fallacy 7: What Constitutes a “high Crime or Misdemeanor” Does Not Vary
with the Office of the Person Being Impeached
The study of constitutional law should enable the student to master all the
conventional forms of American constitutional argument—text, history,
structure, prudence, ethos, and doctrine. That is because while all these forms
usually cohere and reinforce each other—as, for example, they do in answering
the important question of the legitimacy of judicial review—sometimes they do
not.
Sometimes the text will be especially authoritative and can override the
distant murmurs of history. Article I, section 6 of the Constitution refers to
“Treason, Felony, and Breach of the Peace”; Article IV, section 2 speaks of
“Treason, Felony, or other Crime.”224 We know that in writing the
Impeachment Clause, the Framers took the phrase “high Crimes and
Misdemeanors” from British impeachment practice, yet we also know that this
practice had become odious by the time the Americans drafted their
Constitution, and little of the purpose of British impeachment—removing
ministers of the Crown who were protected by the king—is relevant to the
American government. A comparison of the three texts, however, shows us that
223.
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whatever the Framers and ratiﬁers had in mind, “high Crimes and
Misdemeanors” most likely did not mean common crimes like felonies or
breaches of the peace.
Sometimes we will want ethos and structure to provide distinctions that the
framework language of a Constitution does not. Nothing in the text of the
Constitution speciﬁcally forbids a state from taxing the operations of the
federal government. The notion, however, that a legislative body can tax only
those persons who are represented in that body—or who seek its protection—is
a fundamental principle of our constitutional ethos and the structure of
federalism.225 The same sort of analysis applies to the conﬁrmation of judges
and cabinet members: the text makes no distinction between them, but lifetime
appointment to a coordinate branch of government demands much stricter
scrutiny than the fulﬁllment of a president’s judgment in choosing his
subordinates.
This marshaling of the forms of argument helps us dismiss the suggestion
that the standards for the impeachment of a president are the same as they are
for judges and other civil officers. Here, too, the text makes no distinction, but
as a structural matter, equal standards would be nonsensical. The grounds for
the expulsion of the one person elected by the entire nation to preside over the
executive cannot be the same as those for one member of the almost fourthousand-member federal judiciary. Unlike criminal proceedings, which are
designed to treat all defendants alike regardless of their station, impeachment
is not a criminal proceeding—that’s why double jeopardy doesn’t forbid the
subsequent trial of an impeached official. Impeachment is the attack of one
office on another; civilians cannot be impeached. Thus the relative
responsibilities of the official to be impeached are automatically drawn into the
question. The duties of the president—especially with respect to foreign and
military affairs—make it obvious that the threats to the State posed by
presidential misconduct are unique. The language of the text provides a ﬂoor,
not a ceiling.
This is a profound structural difference, and it militates against the broader
array of errors for which we would remove a judge, who is unelected.
Discussion of impeachment and of the presidency in the Federalist Papers, our
best resource for historical argument about the intentions behind the original,
unamended text, stresses the unique responsibilities of the president and his
unique vulnerabilities. Almost nothing is said of the other civil officers subject
to impeachment, yet we can readily infer that the basis for removing judges
and magistrates also arises from their unique responsibilities. Ambassadors are

225.
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vulnerable to seduction by foreign interests; regulators to being co-opted by
those they regulate; and judges, whose behavior in conducting court
proceedings requires a reputation for probity, can be removed for arbitrariness
or want of personal dignity.226
Prudential values are also at stake. We wouldn’t want to pause the nation’s
business to search for presidential peccadilloes; nor would we want to cripple
the country’s authority in foreign negotiations by casting doubt on the viability
of “the chief organ of foreign relations” unless he posed some historic threat to
our constitutional order.
This is further conﬁrmed by doctrine. Although prosecutors in the House
have repeatedly attempted to ensnare presidents in alleged wrongs having little
to do with any official transgression—from Andrew Johnson to Bill Clinton—
they have been uniformly rebuffed. The Senate has refused to convict on such
charges, while evidencing no such compunction about charges against judges.
The impeaching House and the trying Senate derive their power from the
consent of the governed, and it is a cardinal principle of our constitutional life
that governments are created to protect the rights of the governed—including
the right to have their consent manifested in the persons chosen to govern.
That means protecting the electorate’s choice of president, unless the very
destruction of the protecting State and its constitutional norms is at stake. In
this way too, the president is in a very different position from that of a federal
magistrate or cabinet member.
iii. chapter nine: particular problems
In 1974, introducing his chapter entitled “Application to Particular
Problems,” Charles Black wrote:
226.
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In what follows, I do not intend in any way to judge any real-life issue.
Questions of exact fact and of evidence are always crucial, and it is not
in any case my wish here to decide anything. But some questions are
inevitably suggested by events, and can be dealt with tentatively.227
In this similarly titled chapter, I intend to apply the analysis thus far
outlined to some issues around impeachment that are on people’s minds today
but that did not preoccupy the public in 1974. This can be helpful by giving
concrete form to our methods and also to indicate why and in what ways the
context for impeachment has altered since then.
The principal changes in context that have brought these hitherto obscure
questions to the fore are (1) new technologies of information, (2) new political
norms of behavior that both drive and derive from our changing culture of
governance, and (3) the emergence of political leaders whose habits reﬂect an
entrepreneurial rather than a managerial or legal background.
Some of these new challenges test one’s previous constitutional
commitments, in my case, for example, to the unitary executive, that is, the
idea that the president as chief executive has control over all the acts of the
officials of the various departments. Similarly, Nixon’s invocation of executive
privilege tested Black’s commitment to preventing the Congress from
weakening the structural integrity of the presidency. Should one’s
constitutional sense of how things ought to be done—what is appropriate and
well adapted to our constitutional system—change in a new era of political
competition, or with new technologies for campaigning, or in light of
unprecedented practices by candidates? A constitution is intended to endure for
ages to come, and consequently to be adapted to the various crises of human
affairs. But it is also meant to provide the methods for achieving legitimacy to
those adaptations, and—except in the greatest crises—that means providing
continuity with our legal traditions rather than chasing the curve balls thrown
by novel and even apparently threatening developments.
A. Burglary
In May 1972, a team directed by the Nixon campaign broke into the
Democratic National Committee (DNC) headquarters, located in the
Watergate office complex.228 There they planted two listening devices and stole
227.
228.
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copies of conﬁdential documents. When the telephone bugs failed to operate
properly, the team reentered the Watergate on June 17 in order to photograph
documents and to plant two new microphones in an office adjacent to that of
DNC and campaign chairman Lawrence O’Brien. The burglars were arrested
by police as they left the premises.
In March 2016, the email account of Hillary Clinton’s campaign chair was
hacked, and a vast trove of communications was stolen. In June and July,
DCLeaks and WikiLeaks released emails taken from the Democratic National
Committee. More were subsequently obtained by WikiLeaks and released in
October and November 2016. Ultimately, more than 150,000 emails were
published, stolen from more than a dozen Democrats.229
Taken as a whole, it is remarkable how benign, though occasionally petty,
and how earnest, though occasionally disenchanted, these emails are. But
carefully culled, phrases and sentences can be made to seem more sinister, and
these were picked up by American social media and US news organizations,
some hostile to the Clinton campaign, and Russian troll farms to give the
impression of a bigger story than the facts warranted. Classiﬁcation labels like
“Conﬁdential” were pasted in to make the stolen documents more enticing to
journalists. Juxtaposed in this way, it seems obvious that the Watergate breakins of 1972 were a precursor for the electronic break-ins of 2016. Only the
revolution in information technology, which made possible the vast change in
scale and the relative immunity of the burglars, is different.
For our purposes, the question is what culpability is laid at a candidate’s
door if he uses the fruits of these thefts in the closing days of a presidential
election and even publicly (and perhaps privately) encourages the thefts. For
example, in New Hampshire the day before the general election, the
Republican candidate said, “[My opponent] has shown contempt for the
working people of this country. [In] WikiLeaks they have spoken horribly
about Catholics and evangelicals and so many others. They got it all down,
folks. WikiLeaks. WikiLeaks.”230 And the day before in Iowa, “Just today we
learned [my opponent] was sending highly classiﬁed information through her
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maid. WikiLeaks!”231 Four days before in Florida, “Out today, WikiLeaks just
came out with a new one, it’s just been shown that a rigged system with more
collusion, possibly illegal, between the Department of Justice, [my opponent’s]
campaign, and the State Department.”232
Exploiting negative information about a political opponent, even if that
information is the fruit of a burglary—as the WikiLeaks release clearly was—
does not furnish grounds for an impeachment. In the WikiLeaks case, the
information was enthusiastically picked up by the New York Times and other
mainstream outlets, carefully dripping revelations on their front pages day by
day, despite their editors’ knowing the illegal provenance of the materials they
were releasing.233 How could the House penalize a candidate for repeating—
even exaggerating—information in the public domain? Where there is no
evidence of a conspiracy between the campaign and the burglars, or no
evidence that the candidate was aware of such a conspiracy, much less
orchestrated it, there is no constitutional crime. Were the burglary
commissioned or facilitated by the campaign’s leadership, that might well serve
as the basis for counts of impeachment. One might reasonably argue, in that
case, that impeachment is the only equitable remedy, because the result of the
election is the fruit of the crime. In that case, we simply cannot know what the
true result of the voting would have been, because the election’s outcome was
perverted by unlawful acts.
But imagine a different hypothetical. Suppose such a burglary— a
cyberburglary—were part of a pattern of long-standing efforts by a foreign
power to ensnare and inculpate a private party by granting his enterprises
favorable governmental rulings and advantageous loans, with the aim of
acquiring inﬂuence by compromising an otherwise innocent party. We are on
alert for this sort of thing in our domestic politics, but in Federalist #68,
Hamilton observed that “cabal, intrigue, corruption… might naturally have
231.
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been expected to make their approaches from more than one quarter, but
chieﬂy from the desire in foreign powers to gain an improper ascendant in our
councils.”234 Then the indictment by the House and the fact-ﬁnding to be tried
by the Senate would be a more complex undertaking. The Senate would have
to determine whether the president was inﬂuenced by such sympathetic
support—including but not limited to the burglary, whether or not he was
aware of the foreign state’s intention.
There can be little doubt that the remedy for acting on such inducements
would be impeachment. At the Philadelphia Convention in 1787, Gouverneur
Morris explained why he changed his mind about the need for an impeachment
provision in the Constitution: “[N]o one would say that we ought to expose
ourselves to the danger of seeing the ﬁrst magistrate in foreign pay without
being able to guard against it by displacing him.”235
B. Bots
There is no longer any doubt that Russian agents distributed information
through social media to networks and virtual communities: posting articles on
false Facebook pages, deploying a battalion of trolls, directing tens of
thousands of bots to simulate waves of reaction and aim them at susceptible
opinion, and to retweet false information from fake sources.236 In a creative
twist on “hybrid warfare,” the Russians over many years have developed an
increasing sophistication in the digitalization of disinformation.
US counterintelligence reports in March 2017 disclosed that the Russian
government had used these tactics to inﬂuence key aides of members of
Congress.237 Disinformation was broadcast on social media, which were then
carefully monitored to see how the targets responded in an attempt to ﬁnd
those susceptible persons who might unwittingly support Russian
objectives.238 The reports detailed how on August 7, 2016, a story was
circulated that Hillary Clinton had Parkinson’s disease. That story went viral in
August and exploded after Clinton nearly fainted from pneumonia and
234.
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dehydration in early September.239 Other false stories were circulated saying
that Pope Francis had endorsed the Republican nominee and that Hillary
Clinton had engineered the murder of a DNC staffer.
Counterintelligence officials have found evidence that during the campaign
Russia targeted inﬂuential persons who would spread damaging stories fed to
them. Russian operatives used algorithmic techniques to target the social media
accounts of particular reporters, bought ads on Facebook to target propaganda
at speciﬁc populations, and funded computer-mediated technologies and fake
news outlets, which they targeted with increasing precision on voters in swing
districts, notably in Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania.240
The campaign manager for the Republican nominee on August 14 cited an
attack on the US base at Incirlik, Turkey—a bit of fake news that originated
with Russia.241 The nominee himself at various times picked up
misinformation from a Sputnik news agency site and legitimated it by repeating
it to his followers.242 False information pushed by Russian fronts was repeated
by the Republican nominee’s team in campaign brieﬁngs; hacks and leaks by
the Russians were synchronized with actions taken in the nominee’s campaign.
The campaign of the Republican nominee often picked up fake news items and
false lines presented by the Russians, and the Russians would repeat false
information that originated with his campaign.243 The exploitation of the
WikiLeaks disclosures of thousands of hacked emails from the DNC and the
leadership of the Clinton campaign was one part of this pattern.
The implications for the impeachment process depend on whether the
nominee, later the president, was aware of these operations; if so, when did he
become aware of them; and what, if anything, did he do to encourage them,
collaborate with them, or help conceal them. These inquiries are analogous to
Senator Howard Baker’s famous questions about President Nixon and the
239.
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Watergate break-in: “What did the president know and when did he know
it?”244
Let’s apply these questions to a hypothetical. Assume three groups of
actors: FBI personnel, Republican campaign officials, and Russian intelligence
agents. Suppose the campaign officials shuffle information between the two
intelligence agencies—giving the FBI information obtained by the Russian
agents (without identifying the source) about potentially unlawful activities
conducted by the Democratic campaign, and also giving the Russian agents
information from the FBI to assist the Russians’ ongoing disinformation
campaign about the Democrats. Suppose further that Russian agents possess
incriminating information on the Democratic campaign, and have promised to
release it in exchange for favorable policy positions in the Republican party
platform—relief of sanctions against Russia and tacit acceptance of Russia’s
annexation of Crimea, for example. If these discussions occurred, it might well
be that Republican campaign officials saw nothing wrong either with their
participation in the WikiLeaks operation or with their collaboration with
friendly agents in the FBI. Since all the leading media outlets had relished
publishing WikiLeaks material, what is wrong with giving information about
possible crimes to the FBI? Whether it shows an alarming naïveté on the part
of the campaign or an equally alarming sophistication on the part of the
Russians, it is easy to see how, step by step, campaign personnel could have
been led to participate in these disinformation efforts. That this made the
Republican campaign leadership into a kind of “cut-out,” or insulating
intermediary, for Russian intelligence does not mean that the candidate himself
directed or even understood what was happening.
Given such a set of hypothetical facts, it is difficult to see how the candidate
could, if elected, be found liable to impeachment absent deﬁnitive evidence that
he directed his subordinates to conspire with agents of a hostile foreign power
or proof of his promise to adopt the policy positions urged on him by those
collaborating in the disinformation campaign. Moreover, it would be very hard
to show that there was an exchange of promises. As we have seen countless
times in our domestic politics, the recipient of assistance can always say, often
credibly, that he would have taken the position desired by his patron anyway.
Whether or not these operations were undertaken in a conspiracy with a
hostile foreign power, they do not amount to treason. The Framers, wary of the
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danger that this legal concept might be used as a political weapon, enshrined in
the Constitution itself a highly restrictive and binding deﬁnition:
“Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War
against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and
Comfort.”245
If we are not in a formal state of war with a hostile power—even if Russia is
to be considered such a power—the giving of “Aid and Comfort” to that power
in its campaign to defeat a US presidential candidate would not serve as a basis
for a charge of treason.
Putting aside issues of evidence, as a matter of constitutional law, a
conspiracy to pervert the course of a presidential election—whether by
sophisticated technological means or simple vote stealing, and whether in
league with a hostile foreign power or not—is an impeachable offense. That it
may have occurred prior to the president’s taking office does not matter. The
legal basis for impeachment would be overwhelming.
The instructions of the Federalist Papers could not be clearer that
impeachment is a punishment for a political crime.246 In a democratic republic,
whose legitimacy depends upon frequent popular elections, there could
scarcely be a more manifest example of such a crime. The constitutional
language of “high Crimes,” which refers to the damage done to the State’s
legitimacy when its officials are bribed or suborned by foreign enemies,
conﬁrms the seriousness with which the Framers viewed this matter. The
structure of the federal government deploys the Congress—with its broad
representational mandate—in a judicial function when it indicts, tries, and
convicts a president; that this is appropriate for a constitutional crime seems
obvious. As a matter of prudence, an illegitimately elected president could not
expect the allegiance of his subordinates—some of whom would be subject to
criminal process—or of the People. As Black put it, “Who would salute?”247 As
an ethical matter, it would be intolerable to allow a president to proﬁt by such a
crime, just as we do not permit a murderer to collect the insurance on the
deceased; it is an ancient maxim that one cannot beneﬁt from one’s crime
(commodum ex injuria sua nemo habere debet). Finally, as a doctrinal matter,
while there is no precise precedent, the Nixon impeachment suggests that
tampering with the electoral process is prima facie a high crime or
misdemeanor.
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C. Obstruction
Whether or not a president was aware of foreign digitalized disinformation
operations before they were exposed, if he attempted to impede valid
government investigations of these activities in an effort to forestall their
exposure and prosecution—for example, by directing subordinates to make
false statements to DOJ investigators, or by offering various incentives to DOJ
officials to end their investigations of those operations—these facts would be
important to determine. It may well be that the Republican candidate and his
senior team were unaware of any of the developments described in the previous
section, or that they discounted reports of them; let’s assume that. Yet at some
point, the president-elect must have learned of these facts, even if he refused to
believe that they affected the outcome of the election.
Many commentators at the time professed to be baffled as to what
happened after the acting attorney general went to the White House to warn
that the new national security advisor had been lying to the FBI about his
contacts with the Russian ambassador and that the Russians were aware of
this.248 Why was no action immediately taken? Didn’t the president take these
warnings seriously? Shouldn’t he have been alarmed by the charge that his
national security advisor might be vulnerable to Russian blackmail?
Putting to one side the much more serious issue of collaboration with
Russia to manipulate the election, or a possible effort to cover up that
collaboration, suppose that the following lay behind the events. The presidentelect instructed his soon-to-be national security advisor to tell the Russian
ambassador not to be too upset about the previous administration’s sanctions
against Russia because he planned to reverse them once he became president.
The president-elect saw no problem with undermining the previous
administration’s policy—after all there would be a new president in a few
weeks. Not until a Washington Post article appeared exposing these preinauguration contacts was the president forced to dismiss his agent.249
248.
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In this hypothetical, the president would not be moved by the attorney
general’s warning; he knew his national security advisor couldn’t be
blackmailed with the threat of exposure to the president because there was
nothing to expose. Nevertheless, the president may have begun to realize that
pre-inauguration contacts with the Russians, while intended to be merely
reassuring, had given the Russians a weapon to get their own way should they
threaten the disclosure of these contacts to the public. Coupled with the
collusion charges then beginning to surface, the possibility of such a disclosure
might well have motivated the new president to make efforts to quell any
investigation into the matter, including ﬁring his own national security advisor.
Perhaps this hypothetical even helps us analyze other situations in which a
president is grappling with a crisis of legitimacy that may be only partly of his
making.
One sometimes neglected element in our construction of the impeachment
term “bribery” is that, as Black put it, “bribery may mean the taking as well as
the giving of a bribe.”250 “Is it ‘bribery,’” he asks, “to suggest to a federal judge,
engaged in trying a case crucial to the executive branch, that the directorship of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation might be available?”251 It all depends on the
motive and intent of the president.
Imagine further that a president invited the FBI director to dinner at the
White House, and in the course of their discussion the director asked whether
he would be kept on, and the president said, “I’ll think about it” and then
immediately asked whether he was the subject of an FBI investigation. This
might put the president on dangerous ground. The fact that he could simply
order the FBI director to cease any such investigation does not alter the fact
that offering an inducement to act—by, for example, suggesting that the
director’s future in his official position might hinge on his shutting down an
investigation of the president—comes perilously close to offering a bribe. It is
no defense to say that the appointment, unlike the secret payment, is made in
public: the bribe is not the appointment, but the promise to appoint in
exchange for the performance of an official act.
Suppose, then, the president expressed the hope that the FBI director
would drop the investigation into the dismissed national security advisor
(whose lying to federal officials about pre-inauguration contacts with the
Russians may well have been done at the president’s direction). In the context

-ee11-11e6-b4ff-ac2cf509efe5_story.html?utm_term=.529646692e09
/PG5S-MCYY].
250. BLACK & BOBBITT, supra note 18, at 25.
251. Id.
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of the pending reappointment (or dismissal) of the director, this, too, could be
construed as a quid pro quo. The fact that the president could have simply
ordered the FBI to drop the investigation actually counts against him: it makes
it appear that he was loath to give that order and was seeking some
extraconstitutional way to bring about the same result. This construction is
conﬁrmed if the president has tried to get other agencies, like the National
Security Agency and the office of the director of national intelligence, to
interfere with the FBI. Because the investigation concerns the president’s own
conduct, these actions suggest that rather than taking care to see that the laws
are faithfully enforced, he is, for self-serving and possibly even sinister motives,
trying stealthily to derail their enforcement. Suppose, as well, we learned from
a National Security Council memorandum of the president’s conversation with
Russian diplomats and that he told them, “I just ﬁred the head of the FBI. I
faced great pressure because of Russia. That’s taken off.”
It’s worth recalling that Article 1, section 4 of the Articles of Impeachment
against President Nixon accused him of “interfering or endeavouring to
interfere with the conduct of investigations by the Department of Justice [and]
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.”252 From this we have another famous
phrase of the era—”It’s not the crime, it’s the cover-up.”
Legal commentators who think the key question is whether the president’s
actions violated Title 18 U.S.C. 73 miss the point.253 “Obstruction of justice”
does not appear in the Constitution. Whether it can serve as a basis for an
impeachment depends on whether the president’s actions constitute the kind of
wanton constitutional dereliction captured by the phrase “high Crimes and
Misdemeanors,” not on whether they conform to the prohibitions contained in
a criminal statute. Attempting to distort an otherwise valid investigation of the
executive by the Department of Justice and the FBI is a basis for impeachment
that is affirmed by the precedent of Nixon’s impeachment.
The standards of a criminal statute, which are supposed to be quite
rigorous in our system, and which generally require scienter,254 or knowledge of
wrongdoing, on the part of the defendant, cannot substitute for the standards
of impeachment by the House and conviction by the Senate. The standards for
impeachment need not depend upon the president’s actual intent to commit a
crime, constitutional or otherwise. The Framers repeatedly stated that the

252.

H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON, PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES, H.R. REP. NO. 93-1305, at 2 (1974).
253. See 18. U.S.C. §§ 1501-1521 (2018) (criminal statutes prohibiting obstruction of justice).
254. See SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS
258-59 (10th ed. 2017).
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president could be impeached for the acts of his subordinates, whether or not
he directed them in their misdeeds.
That doesn’t mean that the president’s motives are irrelevant, only that the
inquiry for a statutory crime is not the same as for a constitutional crime. Once
out of office, a president can always be prosecuted for his statutory violations,
and if convicted, his conviction can be contested and appealed. But the damage
done by undoing an election through an impeachment that depends on too
many inferences from behavior that may have been innocent cannot be so easily
remedied. Motives count, even if they need not be as speciﬁc as those
demanded by the ordinary criminal processes.
D. Pardons
In September 1974, President Gerald Ford pardoned his predecessor
Richard Nixon for all crimes that Nixon had “committed or may have
committed or taken part in” with regard to the Watergate scandal. Although
the New York Times editorial board proclaimed this a “profoundly unwise,
divisive, and unjust act,”255 most persons today looking back at that action—
which clearly cost Ford the presidential election in 1976—see it as a decent,
humane, and courageous step toward healing the nation and getting the
administration back to the business of governing.256 It was just such purposes
that were contemplated by the Framers, who in drafting the pardon power
mixed mercy with a shrewd eye to repairing political division. As Hamilton
wrote in Federalist #74, “Humanity and good policy conspire” in the pardon

255.

Editorial, The Failure of Mr. Ford, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 1974), https://www.nytimes.com
/1974/09/09/archives/the-failure-of-mr-ford.html [https://perma.cc/W6CN-NMAV].
256. Adam Clymer, Ford Wins Kennedy Award for ‘Courage’ of Nixon Pardon, N.Y. TIMES (May 22,
2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/22/us/ford-wins-kennedy-award-for-courage-of
-nixon-pardon.html [https://perma.cc/6ZUV-ZWXN] (quoting Sen. Ted Kennedy: “I was
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Watergate behind us.”); see also Mark Updegrove, How Gerald Ford Healed a Nation PostWatergate, CBS NEWS (July 27, 2014, 9:59 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/how
-gerald-ford-healed-a-nation-post-watergate [https://perma.cc/KP5H-VDEB]. A Gallup
poll showed a majority of Americans approved of the pardon by 1984, the last time the
question was asked. Joseph Carroll, Americans Grew to Accept Nixon’s Pardon, GALLUP (May
21, 2001), https://news.gallup.com/poll/3157/americans-grew-accept-nixons-pardon.aspx
[https://perma.cc/63BQ-FQ25].
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power.257 George Washington’s pardon of the participants in the Whiskey
Rebellion remains the paradigm.258
Yet the increasingly degraded culture of American politics may someday
present a novel set of possibilities: a cornered president may pardon his
coconspirators, and even attempt to pardon himself. Such scenarios would
have been unthinkable in the past.
Article II, section 2 of the Constitution provides that the president “shall
have the Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for offenses against the United
States, except in cases of Impeachment.” From this spare text we can draw
several legal conclusions: (1) that the power is unlimited with respect to federal
crimes but does not extend to federal civil actions, state crimes, or
impeachments; and (2) that a pardon cannot extend to a future act, there being
no “offense” to which a pardon may be applied. This reading was conﬁrmed by
a 1975 federal district court ruling that upheld the Ford pardon, citing an 1867
US Supreme Court decision during the administration of Andrew Johnson.259
We can also conclude (3) that apart from the explicit terms of the text, a
pardon cannot prevent impeachment because impeachment is not a criminal
process.
Does that mean, as some have written, that a president may not be
impeached for exercising his “unlimited” power to pardon? It most certainly
does not. To take the most obvious case, summoned up by Black, suppose that
a pardon were procured through bribery, or that “the president granted a set of
pardons to assist a foreign adversary in waging war against the United
States.”260 In these cases and in other clear examples—Black asks us to
contemplate a president who announces a policy of granting pardons to all
police who kill anyone in the line of duty in Washington, D.C., whatever the
circumstances of the killing261—the president could certainly be impeached,
and following conviction, he could be indicted and tried (including as an

257.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, supra note 58, at 447 (Alexander Hamilton).
258. Jeffrey Crouch, The Law: Presidential Misuse of the Pardon Power, 38 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q.
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accessory after the fact, that is, as someone who may not have been aware of the
original plan to commit a crime but who facilitated escape).
It has actually been proposed—even, I am sorry to say, by two of my
successors at the Office of White House Counsel—that a president could
pardon himself. This, too, is a “vacancy” sign of the times. Not only is selfpardon ethically ridiculous, it is legally absurd as a construction of the
Constitution. Let us see why.
In the ﬁrst place, the constitutional text employs the term “grant” to denote
the power exercised by the president. A grant is a conveyance or act by which a
chattel or status—some good—is generally taken from one party and given to
another. A president cannot, any more than anyone else, be both grantor and
grantee of precisely the same thing. As a matter of original intent, the concept
of a pardon power was borrowed by the Framers from the British monarchy,
which over many centuries held it to be an act of clemency, a Christian act of
forgiveness that one can hardly award to oneself.262 (I am indebted to the
constitutional scholar Akhil Amar for the Zenoesque observation that if the
grant of a pardon for illicit purposes can be a crime, then a president who
pardons himself must then issue another pardon to insulate that pardon, and
another one to protect him from prosecution for that pardon, and so on
inﬁnitely.) Moreover, as a matter of the American constitutional ethos, we have
a long-standing principle, applying not only to reprieves and pardons but to
prosecutions, judgments, and even jury participation, that no one can be a
judge in his own cause. This is captured by the familiar legal phrase “nemo
judex in causa sua.”
Nor should it be dismissed that giving the president the power of selfpardon effectively licenses him to commit any crime with impunity, subject
262.

See Austin Sarat, At the Boundaries of Law: Executive Clemency, Sovereign Prerogative, and the
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argument against the validity of presidential self-pardons).
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only to impeachment which he might then by illegal means—including the
arrest and detention of members of Congress—evade.
Furthermore, at the Convention Edmund Randolph made the proposal
that treason be exempted from the scope of the pardon power. “The President
may himself be guilty . . . . The Traytors may be his own instruments.” In
response to this concern, James Wilson replied that were the president “himself
a party to the guilt, he can be impeached and prosecuted.” With this assurance,
Randolph’s concern was set aside and no exemption for treason was made to
the pardon power of the president.263 Obviously, a self-pardon is inconsistent
with this colloquy.
Finally, we have the Nixon precedent. Had Nixon been able to pardon
himself, there was little reason for him not to do so, thereby sparing Ford the
political cost of pardoning him and avoiding the possibility that Ford would
decline to do it (as President George W. Bush declined to pardon a White
House subordinate of his264).
Putting aside, however, the moral opprobrium that would cling to such an
action, there is cause for circumspection on the part of the president regardless
of his sensitivities. A self-pardon, like any other pardon, might imply to the
public that a crime has been committed, a concession the president might not
wish to make if he has any doubts about the validity of his reprieve.
Nor are pardons entirely beneﬁcial for a White House hoping to free itself
of an entangling investigation. Once potential witnesses are pardoned, they
may no longer claim Fifth Amendment immunity when testifying before
Congressional tribunals, because they are already immunized from
prosecution.265 Here, the road to presidential impeachment may lie directly
through his pardon of others, who in addition to losing some shields of due
process may also lose their incentive to protect him.
It remains only to observe that for the president to grant a pardon to a
potential witness in order to protect himself in such circumstances would itself
be an impeachable offense. It would constitute a bribe and a patent refusal to
see that the duties of the chief law enforcement officer have been faithfully
executed.
263.
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E. Incitement
It is an open question—but not one that we lack the methods to answer—
whether incitements to violence against protestors, the news media, ethnic or
religious groups, or members of the bureaucracy and the judiciary amount to
“high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” I suppose it would depend on the
consistency and persistence of the incitements, the practical effects on the body
politic of such septic exhortations, and even the seriousness with which they
are made (and taken). Such a fact-centered inquiry is analogous to the
investigation of a president’s motives to determine whether he has committed
bribery. In both cases, the same acts might or might not serve as a valid
predicate for impeachment, depending on context and circumstances. It would
be primarily a prudential constitutional inquiry, examining the practical effects
of such incitements and whether they put the country at risk of civil conﬂict.
We have never had to confront such a possibility, but the increasing
vituperation of public life and the lack of scruple with which accusations are
made from many quarters can create an atmosphere in which a president who
both contributes to and beneﬁts politically from this debased condition might
be removed from office after a historic tragedy.
F. Intimidation
For nearly a year in 1988, the Speaker of the House, Jim Wright, was the
subject of philippics by a then little-known congressman from Georgia, Newt
Gingrich, who called Wright, among other things, “a crook.”266 The House
Ethics Committee subsequently asserted that it found numerous examples of
Wright’s having accepted personal gifts and of a possible evasion of limits on
outside income through a publishing arrangement, and it made other
accusations,267 all of which Wright denied. The Democratic caucus was shaken,
however, by Gingrich’s vituperative charges and sought to replace Wright with
a more avuncular member, Thomas Foley, who it was thought might be less of
a lightning rod for criticism going into the midterm elections.268 In a ﬂoor
266.

Dan Balz & Ruth Marcus, Gingrich Calls Criticism ‘Grotesque,’ WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 1995),
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/11/11/magazine/foley-s-law.html [https://perma.cc/3P9F-RR6X].

586

impeachment: a handbook

speech on April 30, 1989, that ended with his dramatic resignation, Wright
called for an end to the “mindless cannibalism” and the “manic idea of a frenzy
of feeding on other people’s reputations.”269 By the time Gingrich himself was
ejected from the speakership by his caucus—and had been the subject of far
more serious ethics charges than Wright—the permissible grounds of political
attack among officeholders had changed. It didn’t help that the impeachment
of Bill Clinton—led by Speaker Gingrich—arose from an embarrassing sexual
affair, revealing a character blemish that, it turned out, was shared by the
Speaker,270 his chosen successor as Speaker,271 his successor as Speaker,272 the
chief House manager of the impeachment,273 and other House members who
had voted to impeach Clinton.274
If impeachment was the catalyst for this deplorable loss of decorum, it was
also a consequence. Should we now expect the impeachment process to have
further consequences? That is, should we be alert to changes in the president’s
behavior that mirror these developments in Congress? Claims of criminal
wrongdoing are far less signiﬁcant when made by a House committee or a
member than when they are made by an executive with the power to prosecute.
What if the president directed the Department of Justice to initiate
investigations to punish or disgrace his political adversaries?
Throughout 2017 and into 2018 the president repeatedly claimed that
serious crimes had been committed by the Democratic nominee for the
presidency in 2016;275 by the director of the FBI;276 by the former director of
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the CIA;277 by the former director for National Intelligence;278 by the ranking
Democratic member of the House Intelligence Committee;279 by the ranking
member of the Senate Intelligence Committee;280 by the former chairman of
the Senate Intelligence Committee;281 by the former attorney general;282 and,
perhaps most egregiously, by his predecessor, the former president, who he
claimed had illegally wiretapped him.283
If a president followed up such political rhetoric by initiating actual
prosecutions of charges he knew or should have known to be baseless, there
might well be grounds that he had abused his powers as the chief law
enforcement officer to such a degree that he had committed a “high Crime.”
G. Emoluments
It ought to be obvious that not every violation of a duty or prohibition
whatsoever speciﬁed by the Constitution is necessarily an impeachable offense.
If the president garbles the words of the Oath of Office, he can scarcely be
impeached for it, although the duty is speciﬁc and unqualiﬁed. Suppose, then,
that a president with a worldwide commercial enterprise based on the
276.
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marketing of his surname as a brand refused to cease his involvement with this
enterprise on entering office. Does the recognition and protection of his
trademarks by foreign governments constitute an “emolument” forbidden by
Article I?284 Suppose this global enterprise also sells and rents residential and
commercial real estate, and that foreign governments or their corrupt allies in
authoritarian states surge to buy these properties when the new president is
inaugurated. Does his retention of his interests, however passive, amount to a
prohibited emolument?
The attitude of the Framers and ratiﬁers can be gleaned from American
reaction to the XYZ Affair, which precipitated the ﬁrst international war of the
United States. The affair embarrassed the Adams administration, which had
sought diplomatic negotiations with France only to be rebuffed until payments
were made to the French foreign minister, Talleyrand. This was a common
European practice at the time, although Talleyrand seems to have exceeded
even the capacious moral boundaries of the age; he was known to receive a vast
retainer from the czar even during periods of Franco-Russian conﬂict. One of
his methods of earning income was to sell or rent châteaux to government
officials, who felt obliged to comply.285
The application of the Emoluments Clause to the president has been
disputed on textual grounds.286 It is said that the president does not hold an
“Office . . . under the United States” because the presidency is created by
Article II of the Constitution and not by the Congress, whereas other parts of
the Constitution that employ this phrase do not refer to constitutionally
created offices.287 Recent precedent—President Obama’s receipt of the Nobel
Prize, for example—goes the other way and requires divestiture.
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For our purposes, the issue is slightly different: Even assuming that a
president’s refusal to divest himself of proﬁtable commercial ventures that are
engaged with foreign governments is inconsistent with the Emoluments
Clause, is it a valid ground for impeachment? That is, is it a constitutional
crime that strikes at the stability and viability of the State? Federalist #73 seems
to advise a complete disposition of any problematic assets. The purpose of the
Emoluments Clause, we are told, is to ensure that the president “can have no
pecuniary inducement to renounce or desert the independence intended for
him by the Constitution.”288 It seems that we are left to decide whether the
president’s ﬁnancial interests abroad—or their entanglement with foreign
interests at home—truly jeopardize the integrity of the United States. This is a
fact-based inquiry by the Senate, the constitutionally designated trier of fact in
impeachments.
Perhaps the recent interest in the Emoluments Clause is not, however,
merely an artifact of having a wealthy commercial promoter and businessman
in high office but arises instead from a growing concern about the
commodiﬁcation of politics and its effects on the legitimacy of government.
That these doubts have been stoked by the businessman’s campaign—charging
that the system is “rigged,” that millions of votes were cast illegally, that his
opponent should be sent to prison, and so forth289—may simply be an example
of the old football adage that the “best defense is a good offense.” In any case,
the unease that pervades the current assessment of our institutions and their
vitality is not going away.
We are moving, I believe, from the sort of State we have had since the Civil
War—and a constitutional order that we share with other states that is
committed to enforcing the values and improving the welfare of the dominant
national group through law and the regulation of the market—to an
informational state that prefers to use the market when it can, in preference to
law, in order to maximize the wealth of society and the opportunities of
individuals. That we should have harvested an entrepreneurial leader with no
288.
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CNN (Dec. 9, 2017, 6:59 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/12/08/politics/donald-trump
-rigged-system-ﬂorida-rally [https://perma.cc/YJ56-DFJT]; Jane C. Timm, Trump Again
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commitment to the political status quo—or to customary legal practices, for
that matter—should not surprise us. Our task will be to harmonize these
historic developments with the commitments of the Constitution, and that task
cannot begin with simply rejecting what will seem to many to be very
unsettling events.
H. Incapacitation: The Twenty-Fifth Amendment
The same forces that have brought an entrepreneurial leader to the White
House are reﬂected in many other changes in the American constitutional
order. Industrial nation-states used law and regulation to tame the market.
State-owned enterprises abounded: airlines, energy companies, transportation
networks, telecoms.290 Most industrial nation-states had a national health
service and a system of public universities with modest student fees. Banks
were heavily regulated, and in many countries the same organization could not
conduct both depositary and investment operations.291 The price of gold and
the relative values of currencies were negotiated by states.292 The international
movement of capital was strictly controlled.
With the end of the Cold War and the development of technologies that
empowered globalization, all that began to change, and a new, insurgent
constitutional order began to emerge. This new constitutional order—the
informational market-state—relied on the market rather than attempting to
control it and steadily abandoned the industrial nation-state’s legal
enforcement of the dominant national group’s moral commitments. The
legitimacy of the informational market-state was based on the premise that
success in the postwar world would accrue to the state that maximized its
society’s total wealth by providing sustained economic growth, and that the
way to do that was to increase the opportunities for all citizens. New policies
and practices began to appear as harbingers of this new constitutional order.293
290.
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Democracies, in STATE TRANSFORMATIONS IN OECD COUNTRIES 19, 20 (Heinz Rothgang &
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When states go from a reliance on law and regulation, so characteristic of
the industrial nation-state, to deregulation not only of industries but, far more
importantly, of women’s reproduction294; when they move from armies raised
by conscription to an all-volunteer force, as all the most powerful states have
done295; when they end their policies of tuition-free higher education in favor
of tuition fees and need-based and merit-based scholarships296; when they go
from providing direct cash transfers like unemployment compensation to jobskills training to get workers back into the labor market297; when state-owned
enterprises are replaced by sovereign wealth funds298; when market-based
regimes of direct democracy like referenda, recall votes, political polling, and
voter initiatives begin to spread in preference to representational systems,299
turning citizens of a polity into consumers of its political products—when all
this happens, we are seeing the beginnings of a change in the constitutional
order.
One such change may be the adaptation of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
as a supplement to impeachment, triggering action in Congress, rather like
voter initiatives that can propose statutes and thus prompt legislative action.
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The Twenty-Fifth Amendment was a direct consequence of the
assassination of President John F. Kennedy.300 After the disputed succession of
John Tyler, it had been accepted that a vice-president would accede to the office
of the presidency on the death or removal from office of the president.301 But
what if Kennedy had lived in an incapacitated state, as James Garﬁeld did for
almost three months? Or what if Lyndon Johnson, who had had a near fatal
heart attack in 1955, was felled by a debilitating but not fatal stroke, like the one
that left Woodrow Wilson an invalid for the last seventeen months of his
term?302 These questions were addressed by the Twenty-Fifth Amendment,
which provides, among other things,303 that if the vice-president and a
majority of the cabinet (or such other body as Congress may designate) inform
the Senate and House that the president is “unable to discharge the power and
duties of his office,” the vice-president shall immediately assume those
authorities. If the president disputes this action, Congress shall decide, by a
two-thirds vote of both Houses, whether the vice-president shall continue as
acting president or the president shall resume his powers.
Although the intention behind the Amendment was clearly to address
physical disabilities, its language is not so limited. Unlike impeachment, the
grounds for removal are not speciﬁed. It may be that some future president will
be removed when two-thirds of the Congress wish to do so on grounds of
maladministration or even over policy differences. This would be a large step
toward a parliamentary government,304 because the Senate can control the
membership of the cabinet, and in any event, the Congress can designate the
group that along with the vice-president—who is hardly a disinterested party—
is charged with certifying the president’s inability to govern.
300.
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It does not matter that such a revolutionary change is incompatible with
the plan of the Framers and ratiﬁers of the unamended text; it’s the intentions
of the Framers and ratiﬁers of the Amendment and the text of that Amendment
that count. The check on such an alteration in our constitutional plan might
then lie with the judiciary, which could affirm or deny an extraordinary writ
brought to determine the identity of the lawful occupant of the presidential
office.
All this lies pregnant in our Constitution; let us hope it has a long gestation
period.
iv. decision according to law
Is the decision to impeach and then to convict the president a matter of
law?
The ﬁrst question must be: Are we bound by the legal interpretation of the
Constitution on any subject that has not been, and may never be, adjudicated
by the US Supreme Court? If the answer is no, doesn’t this simply amount to
“might makes right,” the ancient notion that whoever has the ultimate power
to make a decision is ipso facto correct as to the law? On this view, sovereignty
simply lies with the effective decider.305 If that is true, then it would seem to
apply to the Supreme Court as well, whose decisions are, after all, not
reviewable. But then why do our various deciders bother with judicial
opinions, presidential statements, congressional resolutions, rules, or
precedents?
There are those who do not shrink from such conclusions; like most cynics,
they call themselves “realists.” But is their account an accurate description of
the way things really operate in the American constitutional system? (It’s
interesting that the persons who make such claims rarely have experience in
government service.) Is the Supreme Court—or the Congress, with respect to
impeachment—infallible because it is ﬁnal? If not, if other branches and our
people must concur and accept the decisions of government, then perhaps such
decisions are not as ﬁnal as they seem. If that is the case, how do they—and
we—determine what is right when the mighty disagree, or fumble for reasons
to account for their actions? The whole theory of American government,
limned in the Declaration of Independence and given operational form in the
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Constitution, is that power alone does not legitimate, that legitimacy can only
come from the adherence to the rule of law by means of which our People have
accorded power to government. This theory will always be tested. Each
generation will live out the experiments that verify or falsify it. It may
ultimately prove a tragedy, but it is not farce or a charade—not yet, anyway.
Are there neutral, general principles for all constitutional questions? If
there are, why should they guide us? And if they should, how would that
guidance work? If after a conscientious attempt to discern and apply the law,
we disagreed and found the law insufficiently determinate to compel a
consensus, how would we resolve that conﬂict? Why wouldn’t such an impasse
show that the whole enterprise was a waste of time—or worse, a mystifying
facade?306
We begin by insisting that we really are trying to be neutral, general, and
principled in applying the rules we can agree on. With respect to impeachment,
we must imagine that the president to be impeached is of the opposite party to
the one being tried. If we think the Emoluments Clause forbids substantial
income to the incumbent of the White House outside his salary, we must ask
ourselves whether we would also have required the Clinton Foundation to
dissolve itself in order to avoid the appearance of transgression. We must
imagine that a similar case could come up in the future for which the
impeachment today would serve as a controlling precedent. If we say that a
president cannot be impeached for actions he took while a candidate, we must
be willing to apply that rule to candidates we admire as much as to those we
dislike. We must be able to state a clear and coherent principle. An example
might be Actions taken before holding office cannot serve as the grounds for the
impeachment of a president unless they bear on the electoral process itself. Is that
statement sufficiently robust to be applied by other deciders than ourselves?
What does “bear on the electoral process” mean?
Thus we test our ﬁdelity to the rule of law by imagining whether we would
be willing and able, in the case of crafting a workable principle, to apply rules
to presidents toward whom we might feel differently than we do toward the
incumbent.
How do we derive these principles? We begin with the six fundamental
forms of argument, which can be found just as clearly in McCulloch v.
Maryland307 as in Charles Black’s Handbook: history, text, structure, doctrine,
prudence and ethos. But that doesn’t end the matter, nor should it. Our system
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of government presumes that the individual conscience will play a decisive role,
whether it is the conscience of the member of Congress trying a case of
impeachment, a juror trying a civil or criminal matter, or an appellate judge
drafting an opinion. We cannot preclude the role of the individual decision
maker, nor should we want to. To see this necessity as a ﬂaw is to miss the
historic character and meaning of our system,308 which structures our decisions
according to legal argumentation but ultimately requires a conscientious choice
by the decider once those structures have done their work.
So we are compelled to ask: What weight do we give to previous
impeachments? How do we complete the series “treason, bribery, [and other
such offenses]”? What weight should we give the removal from office of
executives of the state governments before the Constitution was ratiﬁed? What
are the implications for impeachment of the Framers’ and ratiﬁers’ rejection of
the parliamentary practice of the vote of no-conﬁdence? Do we actually wish to
divert executive resources through constant investigation and harrying of
executive officials? What weight should we give the texts of the crucial Civil
War amendments in construing the earlier provisions those amendments were
meant to modify? And what of the intentions of the framers and ratiﬁers of
those amendments? What weight should we give statements at the
Constitutional Convention relative to the statements in the Federalist Papers
regarding impeachment? Does it matter that the language of the grounds for
impeachment is the same for members of the executive as well as the judiciary?
How should we understand earlier presidents’ actions during times of crisis—
Jefferson’s purchase of Louisiana without an appropriation from Congress,309
Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus,310 FDR’s warrantless interception of
international communications during World War II311—that might otherwise
be grounds for impeachment? What rules do we want to craft now that can be
applied in future instances of presidential misbehavior (or can deter such
misbehavior)?312
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Suppose that, in all good conscience, we still disagree. Does that mean that
impeachment isn’t a matter of law? That our attempts to craft a constitutional
rule amount to no more than, as one law professor put it, constitutional
“fetishism”?
It’s a good thing that our attention is drawn to these questions, because
otherwise we might be inclined to forget the answers. It in fact reﬂects the
insight and wisdom of our Framers and ratiﬁers that in the most difficult cases,
the rule of law in America is made to depend on our individual consciences.
These difficult cases are rarer than the skeptic would have us believe, but they
are just as important as he claims. Rather than growing dispirited, however, we
should feel inspired. That’s what the legal term “inalienable” requires: that the
most consequential decisions are ultimately up to us and can’t be delegated.
The most important contribution of Impeachment: A Handbook was to insist
on the legal nature of the indictment and trial of the president by the Congress,
and to show how this should be done according to law even though there were
no authoritative judicial precedents. This perspective has many implications for
partisanship and for citizenship. It bears on issues of executive privilege, the
office of an independent counsel, and many other questions collateral to
impeachment itself.

A ﬁnal angle is to ask whether a court should rule that a sitting president can
be indicted . . . . We might ask: What inferences can be drawn from the structure
of our constitutional system and from the text itself that bear on the president’s
indictability? Do the shared ethical commitments of Americans across generations
point us toward an answer? What is the rule that best balances the costs of
indictment (e.g., interference with the president’s ability to fulﬁll his
constitutional responsibilities) against the beneﬁts (e.g., vindicating the
proposition that no man or woman is above the law)? What insights can we glean
from the framers and ratiﬁers themselves and from the last two and quarter
centuries of experience? And even if there is no precedent that answers the
question directly, how do the principles embedded in constitutional doctrine
shape our thinking on the matter?
....
In sum, instead of asking “can a sitting president be indicted?” or “can the
president pardon himself?”, we ought to ask: would a good-faith interpreter of the
Constitution, approaching the question through the accepted modalities of
constitutional argument, conclude that a sitting president can be indicted or that a
president can grant a valid self-pardon? Framing the question this way does not
make it all that much easier to answer. But at least it ensures that we are not
talking past each other, and that we are having a conversation of lasting relevance.
Daniel Hemel, The One Question Worth Asking, TAKE CARE (July 25,
2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/the-one-question-worth-asking [https://perma.cc/M9K3
-D4JL].
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*****
Out of the turbulence of the sea,
Flower by brittle ﬂower, rises
The coral reef that calms the water
— Archibald MacLeish313
The architects that preceded us in ceaseless labor, life after life, built on the
inherited acropolis of law a constitutional structure ever-changing, everenduring, unﬁnished, in parts neglected and decaying, obdurate yet imagined.
Their legacy resides in the methods by which, case by case, generation by
generation, the barriers of law channel the tumults of politics and power
toward justice and equality, and away from violence and cruel oppression.
Their genius was to deliver to us a temple whose innermost chamber contains a
question. They could not decide for us, but they could give us the ways our
decisions are assessed and explained. Having mastered the ways of the law that
they taught us, we must in the end ﬁnd our own answers to the awesome
questions that mastery poses but cannot resolve.
Someday, if we’re lucky, our descendants will struggle as we do with such
decisions. Will they make them according to law or will they sell, or barter, or
give them away to those who are only too happy to decide without having to
explain?
I, for one, am an optimist. That, you may recall, is how we began—how I
began these chapters, how we began this country.
The preceding chapters are taken from a new edition of Impeachment: A Handbook
(Yale University Press 2018) by the late Charles L. Black, Jr. and Philip Bobbitt. Charles
Black was Sterling Professor of Law at the Yale Law School; Philip Bobbitt is the Herbert
Wechsler Professor of Federal Jurisprudence at the Columbia Law School and
Distinguished Senior Lecturer at the University of Texas Law School. Professor Bobbitt
wishes to acknowledge the research assistance of Mr. Andrew Elliott and Mr. Philippe
Schiff. Their intelligence, insight, and conscientiousness have moved them from valuable
research assistants to treasured colleagues. The judges for whom they will clerk, and the
lawyers with whom they will collaborate, are to be envied. He also wishes to thank Ms.
Zoe Jacoby, Mr. Jordan Goldberg, and Mr. Salil Dudani of the Yale Law Journal for their
assistance in producing this version of the Impeachment chapters for publication in the
Journal. Because Professor Black’s original text had no accompanying notes, the publisher
decided to continue this format in the new edition. It therefore fell to the Journal to print
these chapters with extensive notes in order to provide a resource for students, scholars,
lawyers, journalists, and public officials.
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